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One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. 
 Martin Luther King Jr.
In Germany they first came for the Communists, 
and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Communist. 
Then they came for the Jews, 
and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Jew. 
Then they came for the trade unionists, 
and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a trade unionist. 
Then they came for the Catholics, 
and I didn’t speak up because I was a Protestant. 
Then they came for me 
and by that time no one was left to speak up. 
 Martin Niemöller
You assist an evil system most effectively by obeying 
its orders and decrees. 
An evil system never deserves such allegiance. 
Allegiance to it means partaking of the evil. 
A good person will resist an evil system 
with his or her whole soul. 
 M. K. Gandhi
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Die Geschichte Kambodschas seit der Mitte des 
20.  Jahrhunderts ist ein Beispiel für die Hoffnungen 
der Dekolonisierung und für die Schwierigkeiten, die 
ihr bereitet wurden: Der Versuch einer eigenständigen 
nationalen Entwicklung wurde rasch durch die Verstri-
ckungen in den antikommunistischen Vietnam-Krieg 
beendet. Es folgte die brutale Herrschaft der Roten 
Khmer, deren Vertreibung Hoffnungen auf einen wirt-
schaftlichen, politischen, und sozialen Wiederaufbau 
der Landes weckten. Dabei prägen sehr unterschiedli-
che und widersprüchliche Interessen die Richtung und 
die Form dieser Entwicklung. Teils zu Recht, teils zu 
Unrecht, gilt Kambodscha als ein insgesamt durchaus 
positives Beispiel für eine Rückkehr zu staatlicher und 
gesellschaftlicher Normalität. Ausdruck davon sind 
Wirtschaftswachstum und ausländische Investitionen, 
ein Aufschwung des Tourismus, Pressefreiheit und for-
mal demokratische Strukturen.
Aktuell stehen die Zeichen allerdings auf einer zuneh-
mend autoritären, repressiven Regierungsweise, in der 
sich die Ungerechtigkeiten, Gewaltförmigkeit und Kor-
ruption dieser Entwicklung niederschlagen. Einer der 
Bereiche, in dem sich diese Tendenzen zeigen, ist die 
Situation zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen und 
sozialer Bewegungen. Einerseits ist die Zahl der Men-
schen und Organisationen gestiegen, die ihre Stimme 
erheben und von den Regierenden Rechenschaft ver-
langen. Gestärkt wird dieser Trend durch eine wach-
sende politische und gewerkschaftliche Oppositions-
bewegung, die das autoritäre Regime herausfordert 
und mit Forderungen, Demonstrationen und Wahlerfol-
gen auf kommunaler Ebene unter Druck setzt. Gleich-
zeitig beschränken die Einführung neuer, repressiver 
Gesetze und eine obrigkeitshörige Justiz die Versamm-
lungs- und Meinungsfreiheit der Opposition stark. In 
dieser Situation, in der die demokratischen Spielräume 
eingeschränkt werden, gleichzeitig aber eine aktive 
Bürgerbewegung wächst, lotet die Studie sowohl die 
Bedrohungen als auch die Chancen für Akteure aus, 
die Demokratie, Menschenrechte und sozialen Wandel 
voran bringen wollen.
Dabei ist die Studie eher pessimistisch: Anstatt die 
Bevölkerungsgruppen, mit denen sie arbeiten, in die 
Lage zu versetzen, die Ursachen von Rechtsverstö-
ßen, Korruption und Ausbeutung anzugehen, eröff-
nen viele NGOs und Entwicklungspartner staatlichen 
Institutionen, die synonym sind mit der regierenden 
Cambodia People’s Party (CPP), Möglichkeiten, sich an 
NGO-Projekten zu bereichern. Das trägt dazu bei, die 
Macht der CPP, die wesentlich auf Patronage und Kor-
ruption beruht, weiter zu stärken. Ein zentrales Inst-
rument dafür ist das Gesetz über Vereinigungen und 
Nicht regierungsorganisationen (LANGO), das die Mög-
lichkeiten der CPP, von NGO-Projekten zu profitieren, 
noch weiter ausweitet.
Diese Studie, die von einer internationalen Nicht-
regie rungsorganisation in Auftrag gegeben wurde, soll 
einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung von Strategien leisten, 
um die Zivilgesellschaft in Kambodscha zu stärken. Auf 
dieser Grundlage formuliert sie eine Reihe von Emp-
fehlungen. Seit der Fertigstellung 2016 hat sich die 
Situation im Vorfeld der Wahlen im kommenden Jahr 
für einheimische und internationale Nichtregierungs-
organisationen, Menschenrechtsorganisationen und 
selbstbewusste Gewerkschaften, sich mutig gegen die 
neuen Gesetze wehren, allerdings dramatisch weiter 
verschlechtert. Insofern steht die innenpolitische Ent-
wicklung an einem Scheideweg. Deshalb ist eine klare 
Positionierung zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure, inter-
nationaler Geberorganisationen und demokratischer 
Staaten gegenüber der Regierung in Phnom Penh 
erforderlich, um die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft bei der 
Verteidigung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten zu 
respektieren.
Vorwortlinks: Executive summary
This study was commissioned by an international NGO 
as part of a process to develop strategies for strength-
ening civil society in Cambodia following the introduc-
tion of a number of new, oppressive laws that seriously 
limit freedom of association and expression. In a situa-
tion where democratic space is decreasing but active 
citizenship is increasing, the study looks at threats as 
well as opportunities for actors working to support 
democracy, human rights and social change.
Cambodia has reached a historical moment in which 
an increasing number of citizens and community based 
groups (CBOs) are willing to speak out and demand 
accountability. How NGOs and INGOs respond to the 
new laws, and if they choose to succumb to fear, could 
determine if this momentum will be sustained or not. 
With outreach to tens of thousands of villages and 
CBOs, NGOs are both in a position to empower com-
munities and to constrain them.
Cambodia has a decreasing number of outspoken 
human rights NGOs and it is unlikely that the gov-
ernment would develop a new legislative framework 
solely to silence this handful of NGOs – particularly as 
existing laws have already proved sufficient to use the 
judiciary against perceived opponents of the regime. 
Rather, the primary target group is the new prolifer-
ation of CBOs and membership-based organisations. 
Meanwhile, only NGOs and INGOs are in a position to 
provide CBOs/ associations with the financial and prac-
tical resources needed to comply in broad numbers 
with new repressive legislation.
As described by a number of observers quoted in the 
study, many NGOs and development partners avoid 
empowering approaches that allow rights holders to 
address root causes of their problems. Organisations 
that do not carry out or encourage a proper analysis 
of the power structures facing the communities in 
which they work risk enforcing the very structures that 
maintain corruption and exploit the poor, in line with 
Caroline Hughes’ description of CPP’s model of govern-
ance. Instead authorities – in Cambodia synonymous 
with the ruling Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) – are 
frequently given a role in planning, implementing and 
benefitting from NGO projects in a way that is contrary 
to empowering communities.
CPP’s hold on power is intrinsically linked to their abil-
ity to extract resources – especially from the poor – 
by drawing citizens into power hierarchies based on 
patronage and corruption. This is equally evident in 
underdeveloped rural areas where aid/ NGO funding 
constitutes one of very few sources of revenue. The 
Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organ-
isations (LANGO) increases the pressure on NGOs to 
abide by corrupt practices and opens up many new 
opportunities for authorities to extract resources from 
NGOs. LANGO will also increase the pressure on NGOs 
to allow their projects to be directed by CPP devel-
opment committees or by CPP-controlled government 
institutions – allowing CPP even more influence over 
who benefits from NGO projects. Compliance with 
LANGO would therefore mean that NGOs abide with a 
system that entrenches CPP’s grip of power – especially 
if they are contributory in forcing associations/ CBOs to 
register. This is far from the ideal of civil society acting 
as a guardian of democracy and human rights.
Key findings of the analysis of LANGO, based on desk 
research and interviews with 60 respondents are:
It remains unclear who will be required to register. The 
extensive registration and reporting requirements of 
LANGO will pose financially and practically impossible 
to comply with for associations/ CBOs but also for many 
NGOs.
Executive summary links: Executive summaryThis study, finalised in 2016, was com-
missioned by an international NGO 
as part of a process to develop strat-
egies for strengthening civil society 
in Cambodia following the introduc-
tion of a number of new, oppressive 
laws that seriously limit freedom of 
association and expression.
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The number of bureaucratic barriers will make it very 
easy to prevent well-resourced NGOs from being able 
to comply fully, even if they have the ambition to do so. 
It will open up many new possibilities for civil servants 
to drain NGOs on money.
The government is already able to arbitrarily clampdown 
on NGOs and use the judicial system to intimidate NGOs. 
Cambodia is not characterised by rule of law and there is 
no need for the government to have LANGO to assert its 
powers. Instead the most likely reason for its enactment 
is to install fear with CSOs to make them self-censor and 
self-regulate. Many terms and definitions in LANGO, the 
Trade Union Law and the Telecommunications law – such 
as “neutrality”, “if necessary”, violations of “national cul-
ture” etc. – are intentionally kept vague to give authori-
ties broad powers to control and intimidate CSOs
If LANGO is successfully rolled out, it will help CPP 
to extract resources from Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) by extorting considerable fees. It will align CSO 
projects even closer with CPPs objectives.
It is likely that many of the costs for registration and 
reporting of community based groups & associations 
founded and supported by NGOs will be passed on to 
NGOs. With the financial and administrative resources 
needed to register, it is difficult to see that CBOs could 
be registered in broad numbers without the active 
“support” from NGOs.
An overwhelming majority of respondents rejected the 
idea of accepting requirements to register community 
groups. While there were expectations on oppression 
to increase, most respondents expressed a commit-
ment to face these risk and try to continue their activ-
ities. Both donors and CSO actors should urgently pre-
pare for the situation to deteriorate further in the run 
up to commune and national elections.
Based on the strategies expressed by Cambodian NGO 
a set of recommendations were formulated:
Do not encourage self-censorship: Self-censorship, 
fear and compliance exercised by NGOs risk spread-
ing to the communities they work with and would help 
the government to stop the movement towards active 
citizenship. If impossible to articulate problems and 
their underlying causes it is also impossible to have a 
dialogue about how to solve them.
Address the RBA deficit: The greatest threat to NGOs’ 
and people’s ability and willingness to organize and 
to advocate for democracy, human rights and social 
change is not posed by LANGO but by practices inside 
the NGO community itself. Increasingly few NGOs are 
willing to challenge power and act as a force for democ-
racy. At the same time, the established practices of 
community organising tend to more resemble commit-
tee organising and programmes are not designed in a 
way that spurs the growth of a democratic civic culture. 
All-too-willing cooperation with authorities in planning 
and implementing aid programs has enabled CPP to use 
NGOs to cement their power. Assess who is planning, 
implementing and benefiting from NGO programs to 
make sure that they do not disempower citizens.
Support deliberative education  & critical thinking: 
International NGO should consider, together with like-
minded groups, supporting the initiative to establish 
long-term trainings of NGO workers and community 
activists based on the Earth Rights curriculum. If delib-
erative education is allowed to be the foundation of 
amelioration projects, they can indeed become a seed-
ing ground for critical thinking and voluntary collective 
action, i. e. the backbones of democratic transforma-
tion. Combining rights activism with organising around 
amelioration projects might also provide long-term 
sustainability for activism.
Close the gap between NGOs and CBOs: There is a 
need to develop modalities for channelling funds and 
reporting procedures that do not exclude key groups 
from receiving support or taking an active role in pro-
gram management. The donor community should 
consider how donor demands for formal education, 
administrative and language skills have narrowed down 
who staffs NGOs and their choice of target groups. In 
case there is a strong conflict of interest between per-
sonal motivation of NGO workers and the groups they 
are meant to serve, they will not be able to fulfil the 
official mission of the NGO. International NGO could 
address legitimacy deficits by partnering with member-
ship-based groups to a greater extent.
Increasingly scarce human rights funding should go 
to human rights defenders: it is important that scarce 
resources support those who take on the role to defend 
“democracy, human rights and social change”. While a 
plurality of approaches for how to achieve democratic 
change may be healthy, it is important to see if there 
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is any substance and real commitment to democratic 
change among those “human rights defenders” who com-
ply with government demands that infringe democracy.
Support well-informed risk taking: If everyone 
abstains from speaking out or taking actions that could 
trigger oppression, there will be no one fulfilling the 
safeguarding role of civil society. Only acting within 
a framework approved by the government inevitably 
helps an undemocratic government to cement its 
power. It is crucial that NGOs do not assist the govern-
ment in registering CBOs/ associations and collectively 
resist attempts to drain CSO funds through corrupt 
procedures which entrench CPP’s patronage system. 
NGOs should not rush to comply with LANGO and other 
unjust laws, but rather let the government “push first”. 
While there are limits to how much oppression the gov-
ernment can exert, fear and self-censorship are much 
more efficient tools for achieving broad obedience and 
control. It is also important that those who make the 
choice to challenge power, knowing the risks involved, 
are morally and financially supported and that efforts 
are made to share the risk through collective action.
Cultivate a new ethos, articulate a clear theory of 
change and think towards movement building: Interna-
tional NGO and their partners should reflect on the role 
of awareness-raising, organising and collective action in 
their strategies and articulate a clear theory of change. 
There is a need to assess to what extent individual NGOs 
are seeking to be part of a collective effort and how 
their strategies and work relates to the bigger picture 
of democratising society. NGOs should learn from mem-
bership-based groups how to build unity and strength 
based on a shared vision and a shared theory of change
Build strength through numbers, reducing individual 
risks by acting collectively: While membership-based 
groups such as trade unions have largely been out-
side the focus of NGOs, a common practice has been 
to create artificial groupings of people with the help 
of per diems and other benefits. INGOs/ NGOs need 
to consider how they can support the growth of more 
organic groupings that share strong enough common 
denominators to be willing to act together even if they 
lose NGO support.
Prepare for how to circumvent internet censorship & 
communication surveillance: The importance of inter-
net in raising awareness and enabling people to express 
their views cannot be overestimated when explaining 
the current transformation of Cambodia. It should be 
a top priority to prepare practical measures to improve 
communication security – for example, by increasing 
security awareness and using simple tools for encryp-
tion  – and to circumvent internet censorship. It is 
essential that Cambodia’s few remaining independent 
Khmer language media institutions be supported.
Circumvent control efforts by changing funding and 
reporting modalities: LANGO requirements on INGOs/ 
NGOs to share all project documentation with author-
ities can be handled in a variety of ways: by drowning 
authorities in reports; through vague reporting; or by 
actively avoiding reporting on sensitive areas and by 
channelling funds through unsurveyed channels. If 
constrained by back-donor requirements, there should 
be concerted lobbying efforts by Cambodian CSOs and 
INGOs to influence back-donors to change reporting, 
registration and admin requirements to allow for coop-
eration with illiterate, underprivileged and outlawed 
groups of human rights defenders. It could also be help-
ful to pro-actively create a new reporting “best-prac-
tice” through cooperation between likeminded INGOs 
through collectively developing new, covert procedures.
Fight corruption & patronage, strengthen democratic 
accountability: LANGO increases pressure on CSOs to 
bribe authorities. This corruption in turn strengthens 
CPP’s grip of power. INGOs need to face the obvious 
inconsistency between zero tolerance to corruption 
and knowing that their partners fuel government cor-
ruption by spending outside the books.
A study of the estimated total costs for civil society 
for increased administration, registration costs and 
other bribes induced by LANGO could be used to raise 
awareness about the financial burden on NGOs result-
ing from LANGO. This could be a way to find a common 
ground to engage more groups in resisting LANGO.
Increased accountability is also strongly dependent 
on strengthening the internal democratic structures in 
CSOs. Encouraging democratic accountability through 
deliberative and democratic education, transparent 
and democratic decision-making and abandoning 
“one-man show” centred, hierarchical leadership ide-
als will effectively help address corruption. Concerted 
efforts to address gender equality would be key to 
democratising CSOs.
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Introductionlinks: Introduction
This study was commissioned by an international NGO 
as part of a process to develop strategies for strength-
ening civil society in Cambodia following the introduc-
tion of a number of new, oppressive laws that seriously 
limit freedom of association and expression. In a situa-
tion where democratic space is decreasing but active 
citizenship is increasing, the study looks at threats as 
well as opportunities for actors working to support 
democracy, human rights and social change.
Four sets of questions, as formulated in the terms of 
reference for the study, will be addressed:
  What impact has the new oppressive, legal frame-
work, especially the LANGO, on NGO’s and people’s 
ability and willingness to organize and to advocate 
for democracy, human rights and social change? 
What are their fears?
  How have CSOs prepared for the situation after the 
law has been passed? What are their strategies to 
address problems connected to registration and 
increased control? What are the CSO strategies to 
continue pursuing their objectives?
  What kind of support/ additional support do part-
ners need to pursue their objectives considering the 
changed regulatory environment? What role can 
international NGO play in Cambodia and at inter-
national level to support partners’ strategies?
  What processes has the international community 
initiated to react to the new laws?
In order to answer the questions, semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with sixty respondents who 
have different insights into Cambodian civil society 
(see a list of respondents and interview questions in 
the appendix). This included a selection of NGO who 
have an articulated human rights agenda as well as 
representatives of other human rights NGOs. It also 
included 35 community-based human rights defend-
ers and also several representatives from international 
NGOs (INGOs). The interviews with community activists 
were carried out in seven group forums which were also 
used to share and discuss basic contents of the Law of 
Associations and NGOs (LANGO) which was passed by 
the National Assembly in July 2015. The report aims to 
describe general perceptions among Cambodian NGO 
partners and therefore it was not found necessary to 
identify respondents by name; instead, respondents 
are referred to according to the kind of organisation 
they represent. If, in name of inter-observer reliability, 
there is an interest in knowing the exact source of a 
quote, the author is happy to establish contact with 
the respondent.
The first chapter looks at the nature of the relationship 
between civil society organisations (CSOs) in Cambo-
dia and discusses the ability and willingness of CSOs 
to defend democracy, human rights and social change 
before the introduction of the new oppressive laws. It 
also discusses the government’s rationale for introduc-
ing the new legislation. The second chapter gives an 
overview over key components of LANGO and discusses 
preconditions for implementing the law. In chapter 
three a discussion follows about the practical impli-
cations of LANGO on CSOs, if complied with. Finally, 
respondents’ strategies for addressing the increased 
oppression are presented and a set of recommenda-
tions are formulated.
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1.  The ability of Cambodian CSOs to promote 
democracy & human rights
links: The ability of Cambodian CSOs to promote democracy & human rights
In order to explore the overarching research question – 
what is the impact of the new regulatory framework 
on NGOs and people’s ability and willingness to organ-
ize and to advocate for democracy, human rights and 
social change – it is relevant to first ask two sub-ques-
tions: to what extent there was an ability and willing-
ness from the side of civil society to take on such a role 
before the introduction of the new laws, and what is 
the impact expected by the government of the laws? 
In this chapter we will look at the nature of the rela-
tionship between CSOs and the state in Cambodia, fol-
lowed by a discussion of the rationale behind the new 
legislation.
The relationship between 
civil society and the state 
in the literature
Academic literature discusses different, contradic-
tory roles of civil society. The most common view of 
civil society sees it as a buffer between the state and 
the citizens. In this model civil society is able to hold 
the government to account and is a counter-force to 
authoritarian and undemocratic tendencies of the 
state. Independent of the nature and purpose of the 
various organisations inhabiting civil society, their 
mere existence is seen as beneficial for the develop-
ment of a democratic culture and of active citizenship 
(See f.ex. Öjendal 2014, Ou 2013, Bread for the World 
20131).
1 Bread for the World, 2013, Civil Society – A Strong Pillar 
of Democracy. The commitment of civil society to jus-
tice and political participation around the world https:// 
www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/ fileadmin/ mediapool/2_
Downloads/ Fachinformationen/ Analyse/ Analyse_38_
civil_society.pdf Retreived October 2015; Ou Sivhuoch, 
2013, Sub-National Civil Society in Cambodia: A Grams-
cian Perspective. CDRI Working Paper Series No. 84; Öjen-
dal, J, 2014,” In search of a civil society, re-negotiating 
A very different perspective is offered by the Grams-
cian world view. Here the government obtains power by 
controlling two overlapping spheres. The first sphere is 
the ‘political society’, which rules over citizens through 
force and laws. The other sphere is a ‘civil society’ 
which rules by controlling how we think, what we find 
normal, legitimate and possible (Tanja Kleibl, 2015). 
While civil society in the first perspective is a coun-
ter-force to authoritarian tendencies of the state, in 
the latter perspective it can instead be a means for an 
undemocratic government to increase its control over 
society – by hampering critical thinking and by affect-
ing the perceptions about how citizens should relate to 
those in power. Civil society is a means for the govern-
ment to ingrain perceptions that keep citizens passive 
when facing oppression from the state (Ou 2013).
With these two models in mind, to what extent are 
Cambodian CSOs a force for democracy, and challeng-
ing the undemocratic tendencies of the government, 
in line with the first perspective? Or to what extent are 
CSOs instead a tool for the ruling party to entrench 
itself further, in line with the second perspective? If 
there are CSO qualities that make them more or less 
likely to take on either of the two roles it is relevant 
to ask what these qualities are when thinking about 
ways forward.
state society relationships in Cambodia”, in Southeast 
Asia and the Civil Society Gaze: Scoping a Contested 
Concept in  Cambodia and Vietnam, Ed. Waibel, Gabi. 
Routledge, N. Y.
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The nature of the state in 
Cambodia – all state functions 
are inhabited by and controlled 
by the ruling party
As noted by several authors, the lines between the 
state institutions and the ruling Cambodian People’s 
Party (CPP) are blurred in Cambodia. There is no sepa-
ration between government structures and CPP struc-
tures.2 The CPP controls all the government institutions 
and the government institutions are used to protect 
CPP’s grip of power and to extract resources for CPP 
loyalists. This was recently illustrated when a four-star 
General, who is also a member of the CPP central com-
mittee, declared that the army belongs to CPP as Hun 
Sen is “is the feeder, caretaker, commander and leader 
of the army”.3
Not only the military but also the judiciary are entirely 
in the hands of the ruling party and are used against 
those threatening CPP interests.4 The foundations of 
the ruling party as well as the institutions of the state 
are structured according to a centralist socialist-in-
2 See for example Lintner B., Power and Politics in Cam-
bodia today. Unpublished paper commissioned by Dan-
church Aid, March 2013;
3 “Every soldier is a member of the People’s Army and 
belongs to the CPP because Samdech Decho [Hun Sen] 
is the feeder, caretaker, commander and leader of the 
army,” said Chea Dara, who is among several high-rank-
ing military officers recently incorporated into the CPP’s 
Central Committee. “I speak frankly when I say that the 
army belongs to the Cambodia People’s Party.” Quoted 
from “Cambodia’s Armed Forces ‘Belong’ to The Ruling 
Party: Four-Star General, Radio Free Asia, July 29, 2015, 
http:// www.rfa.org/ english/ news/ cambodia/ mili-
tary-07292015145855.html Accessed December 2014.
4 Quoting a 2015 report by the International Bar Associa-
tion the Cambodia Daily reported: ‘There are credible 
allegations that the BAKC accepts bribes from lawyers 
entering into training, artificially restricts the number of 
lawyers entering the profession, permits entry by unqual-
ified members of the CPP and is controlled by the CPP 
and government,….This last allegation is evidenced by 
the BACK’s withholding of support from lawyers who are 
known to represent clients litigating against the interests 
of the state, where those lawyers then become the sub-
ject of spurious criminal charges.’ The report says that 
bribes are standard practice throughout the judicial sys-
tem, required for everything from securing a spot in a 
training program to settling a case, and even for access-
ing court records. ‘The result of all this is that the judi-
ciary is perceived to be an extension of the government 
in Cambodia.” Zsombor P., Legal Group Urges Review 
of Cambodia’s Bar. The Cambodia Daily, September 18, 
2015.; International Bar Association, Justice versus Cor-
ruption: Challenges to the Independence of the Judiciary 
in Cambodia, London, September 2015;
spired model (Lintner 2013; Trankell et al. 1996 p. 74), i. e. 
a model where the state/ the ruling party has aspira-
tions to control every aspect of civilian life and to pac-
ify any potential sources of opposition. This is, however, 
not a model as fully or “sophistically” implemented as 
in Vietnam, upon which many of the state institutions 
were originally modelled during the Vietnamese occu-
pation of Cambodia. CPP rules through a patron-client 
system, where “pyramids” of “strongmen”, with PM 
Hun Sen in the top, makes up the power apparatus. 
Over the years, the ruling party has tried to gradually 
increase its grip of power and meanwhile prime min-
ister Hun Sen has gradually increased his control over 
the ruling party (Gottesman 2003; Strangio 2014). Cam-
bodia is now described as a de-facto one-party state 
(Lintner 2013).5
Caroline Hughes, one of the most well-published and 
well-renowned Cambodia scholars, describes how 
CPP’s model of governance is based on the leaders 
obtaining loyalty by protecting rent-seeking activities 
of the members of the government apparatus. This 
includes extracting resources from aid and directly 
from the poor:
“Loyalty within the state apparatus is organised 
through networks of personal allegiance, friend-
ships, kinship, and patron-client relations. These tie 
the state to the party and the civilian bureaucracy 
to the military. They are capable of very effective 
mobilisation at times – for example, during elec-
tion periods they are mobilised to support the 
campaigning of the dominant party, the Cambo-
dian People’s Party. However, they are also depend-
ent to a significant extent upon informal flows of 
resources, including funds skimmed from interna-
tional aid donations, “gifts” and bribes extracted 
from the population and foreign investors, and 
rents gained from illegal expropriation of natural 
resources such as timber and land. The networks 
of loyalty that underpin the state apparatus conse-
quently resemble informal networks for the extrac-
tion of resources from society  – and frequently 
directly from the poor. Loyalty from state officials 
is elicited through the protection of rent-seeking 
5 See also Jensen, A, Cambodia on cusp pf authoritarian-
ism: Report. The Cambodia Daily, January 27, 2016, 
https:// www.cambodiadaily.com/ news/ cambodia-on-
cusp-of-authoritarianism-report-106504/ Accessed on the 
same date.
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activities conducted by officials at every level from 
the lowliest rural school to the office of the Prime 
Minister.”6
The new laws need to be interpreted within this frame-
work, i. e. how they fit into CPP’s strategy of increasing 
control and extracting revenue. In order to see what 
ability CSOs have to act as “advocates for democracy, 
human rights and social change” it is important to 
analyze to what extent CSOs are integrated into CPPs 
system of governance and to what extent they instead 
challenge the system.
The relationship between civil 
society and the state before 
LANGO – attempts to harmonise 
civil society with CPP
Needless to say, in this kind of governance model, gov-
ernment involvement in the planning and implemen-
tation of aid programs would be problematic. Sophal 
Ear (2013) notes how foreign aid has indeed been used 
by CPP to entrench itself:
“based on extensive field interviews and a handful 
of focused case studies, Ear concludes that billions 
of aid have done little to improve governance, pro-
mote democracy, or lift the country out of poverty. 
Moreover, he claims that Cambodian civil society is 
an example of the ‘shallow democracy’ implanted 
by the UNTAC mission. He argues that Cambodian 
civil society remains weak and too reliant on for-
eign funding. Even its successes, such as a 2006 
campaign for the release of a handful of high-pro-
file activists, ‘rely on pressure from the outside and 
do little to alter prevailing power structures’/ …/ To 
6 Hughes, C. & Conway, T, Understanding pro-poor political 
change: the policy process, Cambodia. Overseas Devel-
opment Institute, London, 2003; See also Pak Kimchoen, 
2011, A Dominant Party in a weak state – How the Ruling 
Party in Cambodia has Managed to Stay Dominant. The 
Australian National University; Strangio, S.  2014, Hun 
Sen’s Cambodia, Yale University Press, U. K., for example 
p. 36 & p. 129 “Hun Sen’s reliance on the Cambodian 
elites meant that even had he wanted to, he had little 
real power to rein in corruption and other abuses. Land, 
forest, and natural resources were all fed into a machine 
that produced little for ordinary people. Cambodia’s 
health, education, and justice systems were neglected – 
its future mortgaged – in order to keep the Ponzi scheme 
of patronage afloat.”
the extent that it exists, accountability flows from 
the prime minister – a system that has only been 
strengthened and legitimized by foreign aid. He 
concludes that donors should get tougher on cor-
rupt behavior and build up civil society as a coun-
terweight to government cronyism. But without the 
political will for a thorough structural reform of the 
Cambodian system, any victories will likely be con-
fined to the margins.’7
CPP tries to control or neutralise organisations with 
a potential for mass mobilisation or institutions with 
a potential to have an impact on the perceptions of 
broader layers of society: religious institutions are 
controlled by the ruling party; the education system 
is biased towards CPP8; a vast majority of trade unions 
are controlled by the government9; the ruling party 
encourages self-censorship on media institutions 
through ownership and intimidation of journalists10; 
academic institutions are not allowed to research or 
teach on topics deemed sensitive by CPP11. The regime 
encourages mass enrolment of youth into the Red Cross 
Youth and the scouts, which are both tightly associated 
with the ruling party. Membership in these two youth 
 7 Quotes from Strangio S., Review: Aid Dependence in 
Cambodia, by Sophal Ear, Asia Times, Nov 1, 2012, 
http:// www.sebastianstrangio.com/2012/11/01/ review-
aid-dependence-in-cambodia-by-sophal-ear/ Accessed 
December 2012.
 8 Recently teachers in Phnom Penh schools were instructed 
to protect CPP from criticism by students on social media. 
Strangio S., With Connectivity boom, Cambodia’s political 
battles shift online. Nikkei Asian Review, Dec 25, 2016. 
http:// asia.nikkei.com/ Politics-Economy/ Policy-Poli-
tics/ With-connectivity-boom-Cambodia-s-political-bat-
tles-shift-online?page=2 accessed Jan. 7, 2016
 9 Veasna Nuon & Melissa Serrano, 2010, Building unions 
in Cambodia. History, challenges, strategies. Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Singapore; See also Zsombor Peter, ‘Labor 
Advocate Launches NGO to Unite Union’, The Phnom 
Penh Post, December 31 2015, https:// www.cambodia-
daily.com/ news/ labor-advocate-launches-ngo-to-unite-
unions-104171/ Accessed December 2015.
10  In 2015 Cambodia ranked 139 of 180 countries in the 
World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders. 
Cambodia has been sinking steadily in the ranking, in 
2002 it was ranked as number 71. www.rfs.org; – ranking 
of freedom of media, committee to protect journalists, 
International Press institute/ 
11  Master students at Cambodia’s most prestigious law 
school, RULE, have been instructed not to write about 
a number of politically sensitive issues, including land 
evictions, the management structures of the Cambodian 
Red Cross – where the first lady is president – or the 
internal life of CPP. See Born Phopa, Law Students Told to 
Avoid Thesis Topics. The Cambodia Daily, March 5, 2012. 
Accessed January 2016 from http:// www.opendevelop-
mentcambodia.net/ news/ ban-on-thesis-topics-needed-
scholars-say/ 
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organisations is seen as beneficial for a career in the 
sectors under government influence. With the above 
in mind it should be of no surprise if CPP also strives 
to have an influence on NGOs and on associations who 
have an outreach to millions of Cambodians.
Increased attempts to control civil society:
While opposition parties and independent media have 
always been targets of CPPs control ambitions, civil 
society has seen fewer overt attempts by the govern-
ment to control or intimidate. Compared with the years 
after the 1997 coup, when extrajudicial killings and vio-
lence against government opponents were common, 
Cambodia for many years saw a trend of declining polit-
ical violence as Hun Sen had managed to neutralise any 
serious competitors or potential forces for democrati-
sation. Sebastian Strangio describes the period follow-
ing the 1997 coup as follows:
“According to Human Rights Watch, hundreds of pol-
iticians, union leaders and journalists have been 
killed in politically motivated attacks since the 
late 1990s; virtually no one has been brought to 
justice. Violence has since receded in Cambodian 
politics just as most national institutions – from 
the Buddhist monkhood and the monarchy to the 
boy scouts and the Cambodian Red Cross – have 
been “harmonised” with the CPP’s political consen-
sus. Today, true power resides not in the democratic 
institutions imported by the UN, but in the flows 
of influence and mutual obligation linking Hun 
Sen with dense networks of business and political 
elites.”12
LANGO and other new oppressive laws must be seen 
as an increase in attempts to “harmonise civil society 
with CPP” in the face of new threats to its power ambi-
tions. However, the new laws cannot be explained by 
arguing that the pre-LANGO legal framework hindered 
government attempts to intimidate individual CSOs. 
Community-based networks focusing on land rights 
and access to natural resources have seen the judicial 
system regularly used against them in particular, often 
on the most arbitrary grounds.
12 Strangio S. ‘A one-man dynasty´, Phnom Penh Post, 
January 15, 2015.referring to Adams B., 30 Years of Hun 
Sen: Violence, Repression and Corruption in Cambodia, 
Human Rights Watch 2015. http:// www.phnompenhpost.
com/ national/ one-man-dynasty Accessed October 2015
While community activists have been frequently tar-
geted and arrested, only on very rare occasions have 
NGO staff been arrested. Meanwhile, INGO staff have 
faced almost no government intimidation at all.13 It 
appears likely that the main target of the new laws are, 
again, the community-based networks and an attempt 
to stop the growth of membership-based groups.
Why is the government stepping 
up efforts to control civil society? 
Less fear of criticizing power
Many of the new oppressive laws have been prepared for 
years, including LANGO, while others have been rushed 
through in a short time. All respondents interviewed for 
this study agree that the reason that the government is 
now stepping up control efforts include the threats to 
the ruling party exposed by the 2013 elections. Similarly 
to how the CPP stepped up repression after losing the 
1997 election the CPP now again resorts to oppression 
to counteract the increased threat to its power.
Never before in Cambodian history have people openly 
expressed dissent at such a scale as in the run up to 
the 2013 elections. Hundreds of thousands took to the 
streets to protest against CPP, who possibly could have 
lost the elections after ruling for more than three dec-
ades, had there been no serious election fraud.14 The 
electoral success of the opposition CNRP party came 
13 In 2006 several NGO leaders where briefly detained after 
human rights day celebrations. One staff of LICADHO, 
Leang Sokchoeun, was imprisoned on dubious charges 
for two years. On several occasions during recent years 
have other NGO staff been threatened with differ-
ent kinds of legal action but so far without any prison 
terms. Currently three Cambodian staff of the activist 
oriented NGO mother nature are detained. Their Span-
ish co-founder was denied a visa renewal after setting 
up a road-block but charged against him were dropped. 
INGOs have faced little pressure: Years ago the Interna-
tional NGO Global Witness had the visa revoked for one 
of its staff for three-week period after mapping the busi-
ness interests of the Prime Minister and another staff 
member was beaten up by unknown attackers. One of 
the respondents for this study, the Director of an INGO, 
mentioned that an unnamed source had informed the 
respondent that the authorities had established a list 
of unwanted, blacklisted INGOs. See Aun Pheap, Envi-
ronmental Campaigner Convicted of Forestry Crime, The 
Cambodia Daily, March 4, 2016 https:// www.cambodia-
daily.com/ news/109399109399/ Accessed on the same 
date.
14 Transparency International, 2013, Final Election Obser-
vation Report on Cambodia’s 2013 National Election, 
http:// www.ticambodia.org/ files/ TICs_Report_on_2013_
National_Election.pdf Accessed January 2016
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as a big surprise, perhaps even for the party leader 
Sam Rainsy, whose daughter’s American wedding was 
planned for less than two weeks after the election15.
Throughout the interviews with community activists 
made for this study it was clear that CPP now faces a 
new environment all the way to the village level. Cit-
izen’s attitudes towards those in power seems to be 
changing. It was a general impression among respond-
ents that citizens are now less fearful of expressing 
criticism of the regime:
“When we come to the coffee shop the village chief 
leaves because he does not want to hear us ask 
again about why nothing happens with the prom-
ised projects” (community activist)
“They tell us if you vote CPP you will get your land 
back. We tell them you told us that already before 
the previous election”. (community activist)
From an early age and in all public education, Cambo-
dians are taught not to question those in authority:
“The social order is felt to depend upon everybody 
observing this status hierarchy and keeping his/ 
her place in it. The primary social rule, says Martin 
(1994: 11), is “be discreet, unobtrusive, keep to your 
station”. “In the traditions of Khmer moral training, 
to protest against a parent’s decision, to criticize 
one’s boss or spiritual master, to rebel against a 
husband is inadmissible” (ibid.). Not only are such 
acts Inadmissible, they are also foolish. “Going up 
against one’s superiors is considered futile because 
losing is inevitable.”16
As expressed by Tim Frewer:
“An enduring history of invasion, violent suppression 
of political opposition, state extraction of surplus 
produce, and political instability has resulted in a 
significant gap between the rural populace and the 
ruling elite which is often characterised by fear of 
15 Weddings/ Celebrations: Rachel Sam, William Rubenstein, 
The New York Times, August 8, 2013, http:// www.nytimes.
com/2013/08/11/ fashion/ weddings/ rachel-sam-william-
rubenstein.html?_r= Accessed December 2016
16  Martin 1994 quoted in Trankell, Ovesen & Öjendal, 1996, 
When every household is an island. Social organizing and 
power structures in rural Cambodia. Stockholm, SIDA. P. 
34.
authorities and low expectations of the state … The 
politics of fear which plays out amongst the pre-
dominantly rural populace of Cambodia is at funda-
mental odds with the liberal democratic conception 
of a citizenry that internalises the duties and rights 
of citizenship and places themselves within an 
autonomous sphere of society able to freely chal-
lenge and stand up against state power.”17
One reason for the changing attitudes could be 
increased threats to Cambodian’s traditional livelihood. 
More than 70 percent of Cambodians depend on agri-
culture for their living18. At the same time, during the 
last ten years, over half Cambodia’s arable land has 
been expropriated by interests close to the CPP. Cam-
bodians in large numbers have seen their livelihood 
prospects rapidly change, not only loosing land but also 
the access to forest and fish stocks have been depleted. 
A 2010 survey found that seven percent of 2000 of the 
respondents had themselves faced attempts to steal 
their land only during the last three years. Since then 
the pace of land grabbing has increased further.19
The scale and urgency of the land crisis could be chang-
ing norms about how to relate to those in power. Sev-
eral of the interviewed community activists expressed 
that there is nothing more to lose when they have no 
land and no livelihood, while if they protest they might 
at least have a chance to win the right to their land. 
Land grabbing also ended up being a dominant theme 
in the 2013 election campaign messaging of the opposi-
tion. The increase of land-related dissent even recently 
forced authorities to publicly state that “Cambodia will 
not have a land revolution”.20
17 Frewer, Tim, 2013, Doing NGO Work: the politics of 
being ‘civil society’ and promoting ‘good governance’ in 
Cambodia, Australian Geographer, 2013 Vol. 44, No. 1, 
pp. 97–114
18 See also Open Development Cambodia, “Agriculture and 
Fishing”, Https:/ / cambodia.opendevelopmentmekong.
net/ topics/ agriculture-and-fishing Accessed February 
2016
19 LICADHO, “Concession timelapse” http:// www.licadho-
cambodia.org/ concession_timelapse/ Accessed Decem-
ber 2015; In a 2010 poll carried out by the Interna-
tional Republican Institute found that seven percent of 
respondents had themselves experienced threats to their 
land. Miller, Thomas, 2011, Poll says land theft remains 
key concern. The Phnom Penh Post, 25 Jan 20122. http:// 
www.phnompenhpost.com/ national/ poll-says-land-
theft-remains-key-concern Accessed March 2016
20 Lay Samean & Davis, J.; ‘No land revolution’ coming: offi-
cial, The Phnom Penh Post, March 1, 2016. http:// www.
phnompenhpost.com/ national/ no-land-revolution-
coming-official Accessed on the same date.
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Thanks to access to independent information about the 
land situation, created by a small number of outspoken 
human rights organisations and community activists, 
awareness about the land situation is widespread and 
growing. It is likely that broad layers of the popula-
tion now understand that showing unlimited respect 
for those in power will not necessarily save them from 
being victimised. Activists such as the Boeung Kak Lake 
community or the videos of Venerable Luon Sovath, 
“the multimedia monk”, have shown that even families 
of the military can fall victim to land grabbing21. Thanks 
to internet, news about demonstrations and other pro-
tests against human rights abuse is offered to Cambo-
dians on a weekly if not on a daily basis. Through the 
example of the activists, broader layers of citizens are 
becoming accustomed to the idea that one can actually 
challenge those in power. Facebook is now the second 
most important source for news in Cambodia22 and is 
frequently used by land activists.
The growth of social media and the improved access 
to independent information was undoubtedly a major 
factor behind the 2013 protests. A third of the popula-
tion now has access to internet, 30–40 percent of Cam-
bodians own a smartphone and more than 98 percent 
of those accessing internet do so from mobile devices. 
Three million Cambodians are estimated to be on Face-
book, and with the possibility of online anonymity peo-
ple are encouraged to express their views in way and in 
a scope that is entirely unseen before.23
The environment that CPP faces is changing, but 
despite announcements of reform, it seems that the 
regime applies the same methods to remain in power 
as before: by intimidation of opponents and by creat-
ing opportunities to create revenue24 for loyalists. As 
21 For a description of some high-profile land rights com-
munities see Stanford International Human Rights and 
Conflict Resolution Clinic, 2015, Seeding the Ground, Pro-
moting Community Empowerment in Cambodia
22 Doyle, K., Cambodian leader’s love-hate relationship with 
Facebook, BBC News, Jan 7, 2016. http:// www.bbc.com/ 
news/ world-asia-35250161 Accessed Jan 7, 2016
23 Strangio S., With Connectivity boom, Cambodia’s political 
battles shift online. Nikkei Asian Review, Dec 25, 2016. 
http:// asia.nikkei.com/ Politics-Economy/ Policy-Politics/ 
With-connectivity-boom-Cambodia-s-political-battles-
shift-§online?page=2 Accessed Jan. 7, 2016
24 The post-election period has seen the government rais-
ing salaries and increasing sources of revenue for gov-
ernment loyalists in other ways. As an illustration, the 
police has been allowed to radically increase its revenue 
through new traffic laws. An all too familiar feature of the 
Phnom Penh street picture is police randomly stopping 
elaborated more on later, the practical implications of 
LANGO will serve the same purpose: it serves as a warn-
ing to CSOs and it opens up revenue opportunities for 
authorities regulating CSOs. Or as expressed by Sebas-
tian Strangio when commenting on reform attempts:
“Since the 2013 election, Hun Sen has been forced to 
confront the essential contradiction of the system: 
the question of whether it can be reformed with-
out undermining CPP’s political financial base,….
In line with this most of the changes so far have 
been quantitative  – more handouts to the poor, 
more populist decrees. Beyond that the system has 
mostly remained unchanged.”25
One of the respondents, an NGO with presence in half 
of the Cambodian provinces made a similar observation: 
“There is stronger pressure on CPP strongmen to show 
presence at the local level. However, while being more 
visible now compared to before the election, they fail to 
approach the changed environment with a different tac-
tic and they fail to stop abusing citizens. They behave in 
the same way as before, they just do more of the same.”
NGOs increasingly act within the 
boundaries set by those in power 
while a growing number of CBOs 
challenge power
In comparison to CBOs, NGOs have long seen few 
overt control attempts from the regime. This could be 
traffickers and asking for fines for imaginary or real traf-
fic offences, especially before holidays, or in the run up 
to elections when there is pressure from CPP to extract 
funds for the campaign budget. In January 2016 the 
official fines for traffic offences increased fivefold and it 
was announced that the fining officers would be allowed 
boost their income with the fine. See Parkinson, C., Traffic 
cops to pocket 70 % of fines. ‘The Phnom Penh Post’, July 
28, 2015. http:// www.phnompenhpost.com/ national/ 
traffic-cops-keep-70-fines Accessed September 2015; 
Another example is a recent announcement saying that 
70 % percent of official fees paid for a one window ser-
vice at a Ministry were to be kept by the officials working 
at the ministry as a bonus. Kali Koboski, 2016, MLMUPC 
one window service provides bonuses for civil servants. 
The Phnom Penh Post, 3 March 2016, Accessed the same 
day http:// www.phnompenhpost.com/ post-property/ 
mlmupc-one-window-service-provides-bonuses-civ-
il-servants
25 Sebastian Strangio quoted in Turton, Shaun, “Reshuffle 
weighed, found wanting”, The Phnom Penh Post, April 8, 
2016; See also Strangio, S., 2014, Hun Sen’s Cambodia, 
p. 129
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because of the nature of NGOs – it is quite likely that 
NGOs, in general, are not perceived as constituting any 
substantial threat to the CPP’s power ambitions. As 
noted by Öjendal (2014), a long-term scholar on Cam-
bodia, there are two parallel trends: while NGOs ini-
tially were the product of the UN and INGOs, NGOs have 
now become more localized and firmly established in 
Cambodia. However, at the same time they are also 
increasingly interlinked with the government. Öjendal 
notes that there are increasingly fewer NGOs willing to 
challenge the government or engage in human rights 
advocacy. In other words, NGOs are moving away from 
the function of holding the government to account and 
as acting as a buffer between the state and the citi-
zens26. On the contrary, many Cambodian NGOs see 
themselves as an extension of the state, carrying out 
service-delivery projects within a framework dictated 
by the government and replacing the government in 
failed state services, rather than being a force that hold 
the government to account for said failed services.27
It is common that NGOs actively seek the involvement 
from authorities in the planning and implementation 
of their programs: Authorities are allowed to dictate 
who will be the target that should benefit from NGO 
projects and the provincial governor’s office directs 
NGOs where to carry out their projects.28 Several 
respondents to this study reported that it is a frequent 
suspicion that development projects are directed to 
certain areas to reinforce CPP support, while villages 
or villagers voting for the opposition are punished by 
blocking their inclusion in development projects. Pak 
(2011) makes a similar observation and describes how 
local CPP development committees or “party working 
groups” try to control and put their name on NGO and 
aid funded projects in order to increase their popular-
ity. At the same time there was almost no development 
spending from the official budget in the same com-
26 Hughes & Conway also note how “the adversarial func-
tion of NGOs in demanding accountability from the gov-
ernment over sensitive cases has remained uncertain 
and highly politicised.” Hughes, C. & Conway, T., 2003, 
Understanding pro-poor polictical change: the policy 
process. Cambodia. 2nd draft August 2003,P.32, London, 
ODI
27 Henke, R, in Hughes, C & Kheang Un Eds., 2011, “NGO’s, 
People’s movements and Natural Resources Manage-
ment” in Cambodia’s Economic Transformation. pp. 288–
309, p. 309
28 Brown, Graeme, 2015, Language, Management, Culture 
and Community Development. Unpublished paper.
munes studied by Pak.29 Ou (2013) observes an increas-
ing pressure on NGOs to integrate their projects with 
the commune investment plans and coordinate with 
village development committees, which are led by the 
village chief and deputy village chief and an assistant, 
appointed by authorities.30
The village chief – almost exclusively a CPP cadre – and 
the village development committee members/ family 
members are often found to be part of “self-help groups” 
supported by NGOs, in case there are any benefits to 
be made.31 Brown (2015) notes how a rights-based 
approach to development has failed to take strong root 
in Cambodia. Although projects in language adhere to 
empowerment, in practice NGOs often engage in some-
thing very different: “community organising” in Cambo-
dia tends to be confused with “committee organising”, 
giving a key role to local power structures, and is any-
thing but empowering.32 Standard NGO interventions 
are top down and do not encourage organic organising 
of communities.33 Instead NGOs tend to depend on the 
local authorities, i. e. the CPP, to select participants for 
their projects. Typically, the project starts with a train-
ing for which community members have been selected 
and commandeered to attend by local authorities. At 
the end of the training an action plan is produced, and 
a committee is “elected” to implement the plan. Often 
the implementation of the plan is a result of finan-
cial incentives paid to committee members by an NGO, 
rather than a collective effort carried out by the com-
munity. There are few organic links keeping the bene-
ficiaries together as a group.34
29 See also Pak Kimchouen, 2011, A Dominant Party in a 
Weak State. How the Ruling Party in Cambodia has Man-
aged to Stay Dominant. Australian University. PP. 126–129
30 Ou Sivhuoch, 2013, Sub-National Civil Society in Cambo-
dia: A Gramscian Perspective. CDRI Working Paper Series 
No. 84, p. 5.
31 Biddulph, R., The Geographies of Evasion, Gothenburg 
University, 2010.; Ou Sivhuoch, 2013, Sub-National Civil 
Society in Cambodia: A Gramscian Perspective. CDRI 
Working Paper Series No. 84, p. 7
32 Brown, Graeme, 2015, Language, Management, Culture 
and Community Development. Unpublished paper.
33 “Since the poor are rarely asked for their opinion about 
development, they are often the first to suffer its unin-
tended consequences. Far from “empowering” local 
people, the development complex and its templates of 
betterment have merely reinforced an age-old pattern, in 
which well-dressed outsiders drive into a village, briefly 
break the surface of rural life with gifts and promises, 
and then vanish back to where they came from.” Strangio, 
S., 2014, Hun Sen’s Cambodia, Yale University Press, U. S., 
p. 234.
34 Brown, Graeme, 2015, Language, Management, Culture 
and Community Development. Unpublished paper.
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In a study of the use of rights-based approach to NGO 
work in Cambodia Ou (2015) writes:
“At its core is the argument that human rights and 
development converge and, unless the socio-eco-
nomic rights of the poor are attained, poverty 
cannot be alleviated. Its approach is to shift NGOs’ 
strategy from providing charity to empowering 
the poor politically so that they are able to claim 
their rights.” and he continues “Central to the rele-
vance of RBA to development is that unequal power 
relations constrict efforts to reduce poverty. Pro-
ponents are confident in removing structural bar-
riers to the poor realizing their dream of enhanced 
livelihoods and social and political status. However, 
critics argue that altering such deep-seated power 
is impossible and project that RBA will be discarded 
like other approaches.”
Sometimes critics instead favour a “moderated RBA”, 
“embedded advocacy” and an approach of “changing 
from within” the structures.35 It is however difficult to 
see how this strategy would succeed without a power 
analysis in place before/ while engaging with those in 
power or without obtaining collective power before 
engaging with authorities. The presence and close 
involvement of local CPP structures in the planning 
and implementation of development projects makes 
it difficult for participants to speak out36 about root 
causes of peoples’ problems in cases in which CPP is 
a part of the problem. It is impossible to organise as a 
counterbalance to power – and empower communities 
by making them aware of oppressive power structures – 
if people from said power structures are an integrated 
part of NGO projects. Or as expressed by Maffi and 
Meas (2015):
“Community organizing, if genuine, is a comprehen-
sive coming together and mobilisation of groups 
within communities that enables them to analyse 
issues and their root causes and to collectively 
advocate and negotiate their own agenda. This is 
a relatively new notion for Cambodia/…./ To avoid 
35 Ou Sivouch, 2015, A Rights-Based Approach to devel-
opment: A Cambodian Perspective. CDRI Working Paper 
Series No. 101, April 2015.
36 Empowerment is not easily translated into Khmer but 
O’Leary and Meas suggests “to enable people to dare to 
speak” or “to give power and rights”. Quoted in Hughes, 
C. & Conway, T. 2003, Understanding pro-poor political 
change, London, ODI, p. 29
capture by patronage and instead support organic 
structures that represent all groups within commu-
nities, is the greatest current challenge of commu-
nity organising.”37
Frewer has made similar observations:
“The vast majority of NGOs (over 80 per cent) are 
involved in service provision of different descrip-
tions (CCC 2011). Although human rights and cor-
ruption remain high on donors’ agendas, very few 
NGOs are able to successfully navigate the near 
impossible constraints of working in partnership 
with an authoritarian government while simulta-
neously having the space to criticise and challenge 
state actors.”38
Anecdotal evidence from interviews held for this study 
illustrate how authorities/ CPP tries to use and control 
NGO projects through yet other means:
  One respondent, a board member of a major NGO 
umbrella organisation and thus with an overview 
over many NGOs, reported that NGO leaders are 
frequently courted by CPP and even paid to make 
the NGO beneficiaries to attend CPP meetings and 
associate the ruling party with successful NGO work. 
In order to improve its popularity CPP seeks to take 
credit for successful NGO projects.39
  An NGO director witnessed how two very popular 
community leaders supported by the NGO had been 
pressured to join CPP and had since been pacified. 
The leaders had previously stood up for the com-
munity which had been subject to land grabbing. 
However, through a combination of carrots and 
sticks they had agreed to candidate for CPP in the 
commune council election – and attract votes due 
to their previous track record – but had now given 
37 Maffi, Marherita and Meas Nee, 2015, Peoples’ Rep-
resentation in Cambodia, A scoping study. P. 4.
38 Frewer, Tim, 2013, Doing NGO Work: the politics of 
being ‘civil society’ and promoting ‘good governance’ in 
Cambodia, Australian Geographer, 2013 Vol. 44, No. 1, 
pp. 97–114
39 Compare with Ou quoting an NGO Director “After we had 
built a school, we invited the provincial governor to inau-
gurate the building. He came, but made a speech sug-
gesting that the school was constructed by his political 
party or the government.” Ou Sivhuoch, 2013, Sub-Na-
tional Civil Society in Cambodia: A Gramscian Perspec-
tive. CDRI Working Paper Series No. 84, p. 6; See also 
Pak Kimchouen, 2011, A dominant party in a weak state. 
pp. 126–129.
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up their advocacy for land rights and had nothing 
to do with the community anymore.
The interviews also provided illustrations of how the 
personal motivation of NGO leaders prevents them 
from fulfilling the role in the official mission statement 
of their NGO40. While fear levels seem to be decreasing 
among citizens in general, they seem to be increasing 
among NGO leaders:
  Staff in one organisation interviewed by the author 
accused their new director of steering the organi-
sation away from land rights advocacy in order not 
to risk the career of his partner who was working for 
a government ministry. While the organisation had 
earlier clearly expressed a human rights agenda, 
the new director told the author that the organisa-
tion was not a human rights organisation.
  Another respondent, a board member of a major 
umbrella organisation, reported being careful not 
to provoke the government in their advocacy as 
the organisation had yet to receive a receipt from 
authorities acknowledging their change of direc-
tor several years ago. Without this receipt, the 
respondent feared they might face problems with 
authorities under the pretext of not complying with 
bureaucratic requirements.
  An anecdote from another major NGO appearing in 
the study provides an illustration of NGOs actively 
censoring discussions about root causes of poverty: 
when a donor INGO organised a “capacity devel-
opment” workshop for staff of one of Cambodia’s 
major service delivery NGOs, the NGO managers 
intervened to end the workshop when participants 
started to discuss the role of the government in 
maintaining poverty. The leaders of the NGO in 
question frequently claimed that they used empow-
erment strategies and used a strategy of embedded 
advocacy when they describe their work. About the 
same time the NGO was appointed to train the mem-
bers of a major umbrella organisation in adopting 
a rights-based approach. One key task was training 
NGOs in how to interact with commune councillors.
40 Compare with similar findings by Frewer, Tim, 2013, 
Doing NGO Work: the politics of being ‘civil society’ and 
promoting ‘good governance’ in Cambodia, Australian 
Geographer, 2013 Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 109–111
Development partners: pres-
sure on CSOs to work within 
the government framework & 
cautious criticism of LANGO
While Öjendal notices a decrease in human rights 
advocacy following a localisation of the NGO com-
munity, there are instances of development partners 
pressuring NGOs to move in this direction. Many NGOs 
have grown out of development partners – UN, multi-
lateral donor institutions, government donor agencies – 
initiatives that were based on the assumption of the 
government being guided by development ambitions. 
As pointed out by Tim Frewer, there is pressure from 
development partners and for NGOs to work within a 
narrow framework dictated by the government, with-
out critically analysing what role the government has 
in enabling or hindering development and with a very 
non-pluralistic view about what civil society should 
look like:
“Much of the development industry is cautious about 
the two active human rights NGOs…and often sug-
gestions are made that they are biased and aligned 
with the opposition party/ …./ Under the rhetoric of 
partnership and good governance, any mechanism 
which isn’t legalistic in nature or framed in terms of 
working in cooperation with government actors, is 
deemed as provocative, unhelpful and even illegal/ 
…/ Yet few people seem to consider it problematic 
when NGOs and donors, through their support for 
establishing and implementing forest laws, land 
laws and land demarcation activities, sometimes 
inadvertently legitimise the government’s interests 
in controlling and exploiting locally managed land. 
Far from being resistant to new laws and bureau-
cratic mechanisms for managing land, the Govern-
ment has enthusiastically used these new institu-
tions and laws to push its own interests while NGOs 
are largely left behind to work within the framework 
of an imaginary utopian liberal democratic socie-
ty.”41
41 Frewer, Tim, 2012, Land and Conflict in Cambodia. http:// 
asiapacific.anu.edu.au/ newmandala/2012/01/06/ land-
and-conflict-in-cambodia/ ; See also Frewer, Tim, Doing 
NGO Work: the politics of being ‘civil society’ and pro-
moting ‘good governance’ in Cambodia, Australian Geog-
rapher, 2013 Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 97–114; See also Lintner 
B., Power and Politics in Cambodia today. Unpublished 
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The author experienced the same attitudes from devel-
opment partners while working for a human rights 
INGO in Cambodia. As an illustration, he was told by an 
embassy-affiliated development agency to erase quo-
tations citing government involvement in human rights 
abuse, made by the UN Special Rapporteur on human 
rights in Cambodia, from a funding proposal to the 
agency. The same agency funded the office of the rap-
porteur but feared that mentioning his findings might 
risk the relationship between the embassy and the gov-
ernment. It was frequently stressed by the agency staff 
that all projects funded by them, ostensibly to pro-
mote democracy and human rights, should preferably 
involve the government in dialogue initiatives.
While channelling funds through an INGO, to a Cambo-
dian human rights organization well-renowned for its 
evidence-based advocacy and high research standards, 
the same development agency frequently expressed it 
as problematic that the organisation was responsible 
for spreading “a one-sided picture” abroad of the gov-
ernment as a human rights violator. To this date the 
officer in charge of human rights at the Embassy, who 
has been in place for years, has however, refused invi-
tations to meet and inform himself about the organi-
zation in question which remains the main source for 
all the major international human rights actors when 
engaging on Cambodia. The same human rights NGO 
recently faced attempts to exert pressure from another 
European government funding agency when providing 
evidence questioning the official claims about social 
land concessions.
In a parallel, Robin Biddulph’s research has shown how 
development partner efforts to involve authorities in 
the planning of a project against deforestation resulted 
in the project being directed by authorities to a geo-
graphic area and target group not facing deforestation. 
The project was deliberately made not to address key 
drivers of deforestation.42
paper commissioned by Danchurch Aid, March 2013. 
“Foreign donors are also contributing to the prevailing 
patronage system through its close cooperation with 
government officials on all levels of society.”….”It is not 
unusual that local government officials collect “gratitude” 
payments from villagers for projects that have actually 
been paid for by foreign NGOs and other international 
organisations.”; See also Global Witness, 2007, Cambo-
dia’s Family Trees. https:// www.globalwitness.org/ en/ 
reports/ cambodias-family-trees/ 
42 Biddulph, R., The Geographies of Evasion, Gothenburg 
University, 2010.
In a comment on the global trend of development 
partners increasingly supporting “Good Governance”, 
Thomas Carothers – one of the most high-profile names 
in research on democracy and human rights support – 
claim that this trend reflects increased pressure on 
development partners from their constituencies to 
actively support democracy and human rights. How-
ever, rather than empowering democrats and human 
rights defenders to change their societies and chal-
lenge those in power through a rights based approach, 
the institutions responsible for implementing the aid 
programs have depoliticized democracy support into 
an issue of transferring technical skills to undemocratic 
host governments:
“When it comes to fostering accountability for exam-
ple, governance specialists often approach the task 
as a narrow, technocratic enterprise centered on 
procedural and regulatory improvements in public 
financial management. Yet for democracy buffs 
accountability is all about strengthening parlia-
ments, parties, and political contestation.”43
In other words, along with a global trend in which 
increasingly authoritarian governments introduce 
NGO-hostile legislation – 60 countries over the past 
decade44 – development partners also pressure aid-de-
pendent NGOs and communities not to challenge their 
governments. This of course has an impact on NGOs 
and people’s ability and willingness to organize and 
to advocate for democracy, human rights and social 
43 Carothers, Thomas and Brechenmacher, Saskia, 2014, 
The four magic words of development. http:// blogs.
worldbank.org/ publicsphere/ four-magic-words-
development-tom-carothers-and-saskia-brechenmacher 
Accessed February 2016; See also Carothers and Brechen-
macher, 2013, Development Aid Confronts Politics: The 
Almost Revolution. Carnegie Endowment, Washington; 
Carothers, T and Brechenmacher, S, 2014, Closing Space, 
Democracy and Human Rights Support under Fire. Car-
negie Endowment, Washington; “The donors keep com-
ing up with strategies to use the government, to change 
the government from within…The CPP is much smarter 
than that.”/ …/ Seeking the greatest “outcomes” at the 
smallest cost, donors have shifted their focus to social 
sectors like health and education,” “as Caroline Hughes 
has argued, this bifurcated system churns out laws and 
reform designed to appease donors while resisting any 
changes that would throw light on its own opaque oper-
ations.”Quotes from Strangio, S. 2014, Hun Sen’s Cambo-
dia, pp. 226–227 & p. 139
44 Cooley, Alexander, 2015, ‘Authoritarianism goes Global: 
countering democratic norms.’ Journal of Democracy. July 
2015, Volume 26, Number 3
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change even before new legislation was introduced in 
Cambodia.
These attitudes have also been reflected in the cau-
tious reactions to LANGO from the international com-
munity. The U. S. government has been the most out-
spoken, deeming the law “unnecessary” and warning 
about consequences on foreign investments in Cam-
bodia. A U. S. envoy stated “I urge it [the government] 
to reconsider whether an NGO [law] is needed at this 
time, as there are already Cambodian laws on counter-
terrorism and criminal activity, as well as a civil code, 
that address the concerns this proposed legislation is 
intended to address,”. Meanwhile the European Com-
mission seems to have been pre-occupied by – very – 
quiet diplomacy. After the European Parliament con-
demned the LANGO and draft trade union law, the EU 
Ambassador uttered “As we have already said, the E. U. 
hopes that the authorities will give more time to con-
sultations. Cambodia has still the golden opportunity 
to produce a much better law and, by doing so, to show 
internationally its democratic evolution”. In contrast, 
the U. N. special rapporteur on the rights to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kai, has 
been more outspoken, describing LANGO as “repres-
sive” legislation “meant to restrict people’s ability to 
organize.” … ”Cambodia…passed troubling laws which 
threaten to snuff out independent civil society,” ….”The 
law is already restrictive enough; the uncertainty that 
we’re seeing now around its implementation is not 
helping. Instead, it’s contributing to what is already 
a very disempowering environment.” One respondent 
described frustration over the lack of involvement from 
Embassies in Phnom Penh “It was so much more dif-
ficult compared to the previous [LANGO] campaign to 
create a basic understanding within the international 
community based in Cambodia.”45
45 The EU Parliament resolution: http:// www.europarl.europa.
eu/ sides/ getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P8-RC-
2015–0689&language=EN; See also reports in the Cam-
bodia Daily: https:// www.cambodiadaily; .com/ archives/ 
prime-minister-us-spar-over-pending-ngo-law-84863/ ; 
https:// www.cambodiadaily.com/ news/ un-envoy-slams-
ngo-law-in-report-105631/ ;https:// www.cambodiadaily.
com/ archives/ eu-adopts-resolution-against-ngo-
law-87955/ ; http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/ patrick-
alley/ allout-attack-on-cambodia_b_7770850.html
CBOs are the primary target of 
LANGO, the government depends 
on NGOs to implement it
While NGOs increasingly act within the narrow framework 
prescribed by authorities, as described by Öjendal and 
Frewer, there is also a parallel trend which is more likely 
to be the prime target of the new laws. Cambodia has 
seen the growth of community-based groups and loose 
networks of activists who are vocal and effective in raising 
awareness about the problems they face, particularly in 
relation to the land grabbing crisis. Most of these groups 
are self-established and only rarely work with substan-
tial support from NGOs. Cambodia has also seen the 
growth of a strong garment workers’ movement which 
has pressed the government and the business interest 
close to them into major concessions – the minimum 
wage of the garment workers has seen big hikes over 
the last three years. These membership-based groups 
represent a new and increasing challenge to CPP’s power 
ambitions. While the role of the government in causing 
poverty and human rights abuse is rarely addressed by 
NGOs, the CBOs constantly challenge the government. Or 
as expressed by one of the respondents, the director of 
a major NGO umbrella organization who was critical of 
outspoken advocacy strategies:
“Why does the government want to target the CBOs 
and the NGOs working with CBOs? Because they 
know that they [the CBOs] can mobilize people who 
can shout at them outside the national assembly.”
Could NGOs be used to contain 
CBOs?
With citizens depending on NGOs for service delivery, 
in possibly tens of thousands of “self-help groups” in 
thousands of villages, the NGOs are -would they want 
to – in a position to use their influence to contain com-
munity members who could otherwise follow the trend 
to speak out and request government accountability. 
When citizens increasingly question the government, 
it is also likely that NGO target groups increasingly 
challenge inefficient implementation of service deliv-
ery projects that involve authority representatives. Ou 
(2013) reports how authorities are indeed wary of NGO 
practices that would empower project participants and 
try to contain them:
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“it is clear that sub-national government, under the 
direction of the central government, aims to limit the 
empowerment objectives of civil society, which are per-
ceived to ignite people’s understanding of their roles 
as rights holders. Further, the fact that VDCs [Village 
Development Committees] have been integrated into 
the state system allows the state to have counter-forces 
against the activities promoted by civil society groups.”
There is already plenty of anecdotal evidence of NGOs 
who claim to have a human rights agenda trying to con-
strain and “moderate” CBOs who articulate government 
involvement in poverty and human rights abuse:
One of Cambodia’s major umbrella organisations for 
NGOs has since a few years back stopped mentioning 
any involvement of the government in its reports cov-
ering human rights abuse and especially land grabbing 
affecting communities supported by the organisation 
after receiving threats from authorities. The director of 
the same NGO, according to several separate witnesses, 
went at length to try to persuade the land activists 
from staging a protest with the motivation that “it 
was illegal”. At the Asean People’s Forum, organised 
in Phnom Penh in 2013 and meant to be an annual 
“show of strength” of the regional civil society, the same 
activists were barred from entering the venue and the 
NGOs organising the event decided to take land rights 
off the agenda after pressure from the government. 
The Director of another prominent human rights NGO 
made the effort to publicly explain to the land activists 
that they were not welcome inside the venue. Indic-
ative of NGO sentiments towards community group 
activists, an entrance fee also effectively closed the 
event for poor activists.
Similar attitudes have been present during LANGO 
campaigns, illustrating increasing differences between 
NGOs and CBOs.
During the campaign against the fourth LANGO draft, 
the author witnessed at least two dominant NGOs 
initially attempting to keep CBOs and member-based 
organisations outside joint civil society initiatives, 
believing that CBOs were too radical in their approach 
to the government.
Similarly, some dominant NGOs resisted calls for 
including CBOs as equal partners in organising events 
during the Asean People’s Forum, resulting in CBOs 
instead organising the parallel ASEAN Grassroots Peo-
ples’ Assembly46.
The campaign against the fifth and final version of 
LANGO ended as two campaigns: “Stop and Consult”, 
dominated by NGOs, and “Say No to LANGO” dominated 
by CBOs and CBO-focused NGOs.
As elaborated on later, the costs and the bureaucratic 
challenges involved in complying with LANGO makes it 
practically difficult for associations and small NGOs to 
abide by the law. The only way that associations would 
hypothetically be able to access funds and administra-
tive resources needed to pay the costs and carry out the 
paperwork associated with registration is through NGO 
support. It is therefore problematic that Cambodia’s two 
major NGO umbrella organisations have already articu-
lated post-LANGO strategies to give technical advice to 
members on how to comply with the law, while trying to 
engage the government in dialogue about and monitor 
difficulties in carrying out the implementation. While 
their NGO members are already registered, the commu-
nities and self-help groups that they work with are most 
often not and compliance could therefore mean that 
they play a proactive role in pushing communities to 
register. If associations register this will increase oppor-
tunities to control them and will thus severely hamper 
their ability “to organize and to advocate for democracy, 
human rights and social change”.
Conclusion
Cambodia has reached a historical moment in which an 
increasing number of citizens and CBOs are willing to 
speak out and demand accountability. How NGOs and 
INGOs respond to the new laws, and if they choose to 
succumb to fear, could determine if this momentum 
will be sustained or not. With outreach to thousands 
of villages and CBOs, NGOs are both in a position to 
empower communities and to constrain them.
As pointed out by Öjendal, Cambodia has a decreasing 
number of outspoken human rights NGOs. It is there-
fore unlikely that the government would develop a new 
legislative framework solely to silence this handful 
46 Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Reso-
lution Clinic, 2015, Seeding the Ground, Promoting Com-
munity Empowerment in Cambodia. P. 41.
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of NGOs – particularly as existing laws have already 
proved sufficient to use the judiciary against perceived 
opponents of the regime. Rather, the primary target 
group is the new proliferation of CBOs and member-
ship-based organisations. Meanwhile, only NGOs and 
INGOs are in a position to provide CBOs/ associations 
with the financial and practical resources needed to 
comply in broad numbers with the new legislation.
As described by a number of observers quoted in the 
study, many NGOs and development partners avoid 
empowering approaches that allow rights holders to 
address root causes of their problems. Organisations 
that do not carry out or encourage a proper analysis 
of the power structures facing the communities in 
which they work risk enforcing the very structures that 
maintain corruption and exploit the poor, in line with 
Caroline Hughes’ description of CPP’s model of govern-
ance. Instead authorities – in Cambodia synonymous 
with the ruling Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) – are 
frequently given a role in planning, implementing and 
benefitting from NGO projects in a way that is contrary 
to empowering communities.
As noted by Hughes et al., CPP’s hold on power is intrin-
sically linked to their ability to extract resources – espe-
cially from the poor – by drawing citizens into power 
hierarchies based on patronage and corruption. This is 
equally evident in underdeveloped rural areas where 
aid/ NGO funding constitutes one of very few sources 
of revenue. LANGO increases the pressure on NGOs to 
abide by corrupt practices and opens up many new 
opportunities for authorities to extract resource from 
NGOs. LANGO will also increase the pressure on NGOs 
to allow their projects to be directed by CPP develop-
ment committees or by CPP – controlled government 
institutions – allowing CPP even more influence over 
who benefits from NGO projects. Compliance with 
LANGO would therefore mean that NGOs abide with a 
system that entrenches CPP’s grip of power – especially 
if they are contributory in forcing associations/ CBOs to 
register. This is far from the ideal of civil society acting 
as a guardian of democracy and human rights.
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The following gives an overview of key requirements 
under the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (LANGO). It is still extremely unclear how 
it will be implemented, not least as there are multi-
ple vague clauses left open to interpretation. Article 11 
declares that “conditions, formalities and procedures” 
for registration shall be determined by a MoI Prakas. A 
Prakas is currently said to be prepared.
Moreover, as will be explained, the scope of the 
requirements is so broad, expensive and practically 
complicated to implement that it is difficult to see how 
they could possibly be widely complied with or even 
more so, how compliance could be monitored by the 
government on more than a very selective basis.
Mandatory registration – 
but for whom and as what?
The law imposes mandatory registration requirements 
for all associations and NGOs and criminalizes unregis-
tered groups: “Any domestic association and non-gov-
ernmental organisations that is not registered shall 
not be allowed to carry out any activity within the King-
dom of Cambodia.” (Article 9)1. If they operate without 
registration they are subject to fines between five and 
ten million Riel, criminal prosecution, and in the case 
of foreign NGOs, expulsion.
While the constitution only refers to associations the 
LANGO, for unclear reasons, differentiates between 
“associations” and “NGOs”. “Domestic associations” in 
LANGO refers to membership organisations which rep-
resent and protect the interest of their members with-
out generating or sharing profits (Article 4). “Domestic 
1 OHCHR, Unofficial translation on 19 August 2015, Law on 
Associations and Non-governmental Organisations.
NGOs” refers to non-membership organisation which 
provide funds and services for the public interest with-
out generating or sharing profits (Article 4). There is no 
definition of what “public interest” means. According 
to OHCHR this vagueness leaves open the possibility for 
abusive application of the law.2
It is also unclear how “generating or sharing profits” 
will be interpreted. Many NGOs are involved in support-
ing livelihood projects based on saving groups, buffalo 
banks and micro-enterprises of various kinds which are 
meant to generate a profit, although normally a very 
modest one. If these groups are required to register – 
either under LANGO as associations, or as economic 
cooperatives under the Law on Economic Cooperatives, 
or as micro-finance institutions under banking laws – 
the registration costs and requirements will pose a sig-
nificant challenge given their modest profits.3 Article 
20 briefly lists allowed funding sources and does not 
2 OHCHR, A Human Rights Analysis or the Law on Asso-
ciations and Non-governmental Organisations, 4 August 
2015, P. 5
3 The Law on Agricultural Cooperatives defines coopera-
tives like this: 1.Consists of 15 (fifteen) members or more, 
who are the Cambodian national and at the ages of 18 or 
above, who live in the geography of specific village, com-
mune, Sangkat, municipal, district or Khan administra-
tions of Capital/ provinces in the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
and who have major businesses within the framework 
of the system of agricultural production, agro-business, 
agro-industry or services that are related to an agricul-
tural sector; 2. Consists of members who invest their cap-
ital by paying shares that were bought, but each member 
shall own at least one share. Owning of the shares of the 
members shall be in accordance with a statute of the 
Agricultural Community (AC) concerned. 3. Has at least 
one type of major businesses within the framework of 
the system of agricultural production, agro-business, 
agro-industry or services that are related to the agricul-
tural sector. (Law on Agricultural Cooperatives, Article 
16.) According to Praka B7.00–06, issued by the National 
Bank of Cambodia (NBC) in 2000, registration as an Micro 
Finance Institution is compulsory for any organisation 
that meets one or more of the following conditions:
 •  a loan portfolio outstanding equal to or greater than 
KHR 100 million;
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explicitly say that domestic NGOs and associations are 
allowed to engage in economic activities in order to 
pursue their primary purposes. At the same time the 
Law on Agricultural cooperatives requires a member-
ship of at least 15 which is more than many self-help 
groups. Meanwhile, the banking laws prescribes that 
micro saving groups that raise more than 1.000.000 
Riel (USD 250) from their members should register as 
a micro finance institution, and many micro saving 
groups probably reach that amount.
In the 4th draft of LANGO community based organisa-
tions (CBOs) were explicitly referred to, but were later 
taken out in the final version of the law. In the 4th 
draft CBOs were defined as “a group of Cambodian cit-
izens who voluntarily agree to establish, manage and 
conduct … activities to serve and protect the interests 
within its local community.” It is not clear whether or 
not CBOs are now to be included under “associations”.
There have been contradictory messages from the 
authorities on the need for CBOs to register. An open 
letter to MoI from CCHR (the Cambodian Centre for 
Human Rights) referring to a group of land rights activ-
ists – 71 families – in Kratie who had been told by the 
local authorities to register under LANGO, requested 
clarification. MoI responded that CBOs “that do not 
have enough [structure] to comply with Article 6 and 
Article 7 of this law,” were not to register under LANGO. 
However, at the same time it was said that the Kratie 
community still was required to register, but under the 
Land Law. The Minister referred to provisions for indig-
enous communities applying for communal land; how-
ever, the community in question was not an indigenous 
community, neither were they applying for communal 
land.4
 •  savings mobilized from the general public amounting 
to KHR1 million or more;
 •  100 depositors or more.
4 “In accordance with Article 4 of this law, its scope doesn’t 
cover community-based organizations that do not have 
enough [structure] to comply with Article 6 and Article 7 
of this law,” the minister wrote, referring to provisions on 
filing statutes, leadership biographies and other paper-
work. In his letter, Minister Kheng said the 71 families in 
Snuol did not have to register under the NGO law. But he 
said the request from local police that they register was 
“correct in principle because indigenous communities can 
only get communal [land] ownership if the communities 
register with the Ministry of Interior in compliance with 
the 2001 Land Law.” To apply for communal land titles, 
designed to protect indigenous communities from private 
developers, groups must register with the government. 
However, Hak Nhen, a representative of the 71 families, 
It is unclear how to define “enough [structure] to 
comply” with regards to Articles 6 and 7, which refer 
to administrative requirements of the registration pro-
cess (see below). It is also unclear whether there CBOs 
are required to acquire such structure before they are 
allowed to carry out certain group activities.
Additional confusion is added by the fact that the final 
article of LANGO declares all other legislation covering 
the same area to be void: “Any provisions to this law 
shall be abrogated.” (Article 39). In the above case the 
Land Law referred to by the Minister is already void. 
This last article of LANGO also raises questions about 
the status of the law in relationship to the constitu-
tion.5
Children and non-Cambodians are not allowed to 
organise: Article 5 requires domestic associations and 
NGOs to have at least three “founding members” who 
need to be of Cambodian nationality. The draft law said 
they need to be at least 18 years old; however, in the 
passed law, MoI has been given powers to pass Prakas, 
should they want to, to allow minors to form associa-
tions or NGOs (Article 11).
If the MoI does not respond to an application within 
45 days of receipt the applicant will be automatically 
registered (Article 8). However, it is still unclear how 
NGOs and associations can prove to third parties, such 
as banks, that they have been automatically registered.
Reasons for denial and suspen-
sion of registration are very vague
The government has broad authority to suspend a 
domestic NGOs or association. Article 8 states that 
MoI “shall examine the documents and legality of the 
statue of a domestic association or NGO, and shall 
decide whether to accept or reject the registration…”. 
However, there is no list of clear, objective grounds 
said the families were not minorities and were not seek-
ing a communal land title. See Kuch Naren, ›Minister 
Insists Community Groups Are Exempt From NGO Law‹, 
Phnom Penh Post, 24 September, 2015, https:// www.
cambodiadaily.com/ news/ minister-insists-community-
groups-are-exempt-from-ngo-law-95296/ (accessed 24 
September 2015).
5 See also OHCHR, A Human Rights Analysis or the Law 
on Associations and Non-governmental Organisations, 4 
August 2015, p. 24.
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for when MoI is allowed to deny registration. MoI is 
not required to communicate the decision for denial 
or registration in writing.
Requirement of neutrality: The law compels all NGOs, 
domestic and foreign, to be “neutral toward all polit-
ical parties”. (Article 26). However, it is not defined 
what “neutral” means which leave open the possibility 
for arbitrary interpretation by government officials In 
the Cambodian context this is particularly problematic, 
as legitimate criticism of government involvement in 
human rights abuse by human rights defenders has 
often led to such critics being labelled as CNRP/ oppo-
sition by government representatives6. Hence, the lack 
of definitions allows for a restriction of freedom of 
expression (guaranteed under article 19 of the ICCPR). 
Domestic associations are excluded from the neutrality 
requirement.
Even more confusing is the provision that registration 
may be denied and organisations suspended if MoI 
deems that the association or NGO has objectives that 
“jeopardize peace, stability and public order or harm 
the national security, national unity, culture, and tra-
ditions of the Cambodian society” (Article 8 & 30). How 
to interpret these provisions is not defined, meaning 
that the Government can deny or suspend organisa-
tions completely arbitrarily. Failure to comply with 
reporting requirements may also result in terminated 
registration.
The LANGO provides domestic NGOs and associations 
the right to appeal a registration decision to the court, 
but no further details about how to exercise this right 
are provided in LANGO7.
In the wake of involuntary termination, LANGO states 
that assets shall be distributed in compliance with 
court decisions, (Article 31). However, Article 32 also 
authorizes MoI to deregister a domestic association of 
6 For example several regional and international organisa-
tions were accused by the spoke person of the Council 
of Minister of being CNRP supporters when they criti-
cized LANGO and the other new oppressive laws. Radio 
Free Asia, Cambodian laws curtailing freedoms Groups 
says. 2014–10-10 http:// www.rfa.org/ english/ news/ 
cambodia/ new-laws-10102014182751.html (Accessed Octo-
ber 2015)
7 However, there is the procedure for civil complaint in the 
civil court that should logically apply. Se Article 4 of the 
Law on Court Administration and Function, passed by 
National Assembly in 2015.
NGO without involvement of a court. In such a situation 
it is unclear how an association or NGO’s assets are to 
be distributed. This gives incentives to corrupt authori-
ties to deregister an organisation in order to confiscate 
their assets. According to several respondents, a fre-
quently occurring problem is that after reporting fraud 
in corrupt NGOs to authorities, corrupt officials rather 
than punish perpetrators, confiscate the remaining 
assets for their own benefit.
Registration requirements:
Article 6 requires associations and domestic NGOs to 
register with the Ministry of Interior by filing the fol-
lowing documents:
  Application form (2 copies).
  A letter stating the address of the central office a 
domestic association or non-governmental organ-
isation, recognized by the Commune or Sangkat 
Chief. If this is interpreted as a need to have an 
physical office, not just an address for communica-
tion, this will make registration impossible for asso-
ciations and NGOs that do not have the resources 
to support an office.(1 copy)
  Profiles of each founding member with a recent 
4x6 size photograph. As it is unclear what profiles 
means this invites open-ended inquiries by the 
government into the biographies of the founding 
members.8 (2 copies).
  A bylaw/ statues signed by the president of the 
domestic association/ non-governmental organisa-
tion (2 copies). With many small associations not 
even being computer literate this is a huge barrier.
The governing statutes need to have the following con-
tents (Article 7):
  Purpose and goal;
  Name written in full and abbreviation that does 
copy the full name or abbreviation of any registered 
association or non-governmental organization;
  Logo that does not copy that of any national or 
state institution, any registered association or 
8 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Comments on 
the Fifth Draft Law on Associations and Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations of the Kingdom of Cambodia, June 11, 
2015, P. 11.
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non-governmental organization, or the Red Cross 
or Red Crescent or international institutions;
  Rules for selecting, terminating, dismissing, trans-
ferring and removing the position of the president 
or executive director;
  Rules for changing the organization’s name and 
logo, and for amending its statutes;
  Sources of resources and properties;
  Rules for managing resources and properties;
  Rules for dissolving and disposing resources and 
properties upon dissolution of the organization.
Excessive reporting requirements:
Article 10 requires domestic associations or NGOs to 
notify, in writing, the MoI and the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance of:
  Its bank account in Cambodia within 30 days of reg-
istration.
  Any changes to its statute, relocation of its office, 
changing presidents or executive directors, or 
changing bank accounts within fifteen days from 
the change. The failure to comply to these notifica-
tion requirements could result in the organisation’s 
removal from the registration list (article 32).
Domestic NGOs also have to submit (Article 25):
  A copy of its annual activity report and its annual 
financial report to the MoI and the Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance by the end of February of the fol-
lowing year. The MoI may “if necessary” request the 
same from associations.
  Copies of all financial agreements with donor must 
be submitted to the Ministry of Interior and Ministry 
of Economy and Finance within thirty days from the 
donor agreeing to the proposal.
  Copies of all reports that are sent to donors within 
thirty days of submission. All successful funding 
proposals and all financial or grant agreements 
need to be submitted to the Ministry of Interior and 
to the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Moreover, Article 25 says “The Ministry of Economy and 
Finance or the National Audit Authority may, if neces-
sary, check and audit an association or non-govern-
mental organization.” There is no definition of necessity 
or of who would make this decision, making this provi-
sion problematic – the vague wording leaves open the 
possibility of abuse, allowing punitive financial investi-
gations and intrusions into the operation of NGOs and 
associations. There also appears to be no method of 
challenging a decision to audit or a definition of what 
the government considers an audit to entail; for exam-
ple, would this mean seizure of records, computer data, 
physical investigations on NGO property?
Procedures for registration of INGOs
For INGOs, registration with the MoFA/ IC requires the 
applicant organization to provide:
1. A letter of the director of a foreign association or 
non-governmental organization which has its per-
manent office in a foreign country, requesting to 
appoint its representative with the attachment of 
the “profile” of a person requested to be appointed 
as a country representative, one (1) copy and the 
request to open a representative office, one (1) 
copy. This means staff need to be recruited before 
registration.
2. A letter stating the address of the representative 
office in the Kingdom of Cambodia issued by the 
Commune or Sangkat Chief, one (01) copy. This 
means the organisation is required to open an 
office before receiving a registration, which might 
prove difficult.
3. An operation permit for the foreign association or 
non-governmental organization issued by a foreign 
competent authority of the country of origin, one 
(1) copy;
4. A supporting letter of the projects of the foreign 
association or non-governmental organization 
issued by the public authorities of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, one (1) copy. INGOs that support human 
rights and democracy might find it hard to receive 
a supporting letter from a line ministry as these 
INGOs are normally not working directly with any 
line ministry.(Article 13)
5. A certifying letter declaring the budget for imple-
menting the projects of the foreign association or 
non-governmental organization for at least six (06) 
months, issued by its permanent office in the for-
eign country, one (1) copy. 
6. A pledging letter to provide all accounts of the for-
eign association or non-governmental organization 
in the banks in the Kingdom of Cambodia, one (01) 
copy. The INGO also has to notify the MoFA and 
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the Ministry of Economy and Finance of its bank 
account in Cambodia within 30 days after signing 
the MoU.
INGOs are required to renew their MoU every 3 years. 
The timeframe for submission of a request to extend 
the validity an MoU is 90 days. However, only 45 days 
are required to examine a new application (Article 16). 
It is unclear why it takes double the time to consider 
the application from an already known organisation. 
Moreover, there is no timeframe for the MoFA to issue a 
decision before the expiry of a current MoU, even when 
the extension request is submitted on time.
No grounds for denial of registration are provided for 
INGOs and there is no right to appeal. However, as 
in the case of domestic NGO’s, registration can be 
terminated if they are deemed to “jeopardize peace, 
stability and public order or harm the national secu-
rity, national unity, culture, and traditions of the Cam-
bodian society” (Article 35). They are also obliged to 
maintain “neutrality” towards political parties (Article 
24) and likewise they can be terminated if the fail to 
comply with reporting provisions.
If an INGO only wants to “implement a short-term pro-
ject” in Cambodia, presuming meaning they do not 
want to open an office in Cambodia, then they have 
to ask for approval from MoFA through a local organi-
sation. However, what defines a short-term project is 
ambiguous. Neither is it clear what it might implicate 
for INGOs not interested in opening a local office but 
intend to implement long-term projects.
Reporting requirements for INGOs
INGOs must inform authorities of their bank account 
information within 30 days of registration (Article 17). 
INGOs also have to submit a copy of their annual report 
on “activities and finances status” to the MoFa and to 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance, within 30 days 
of the date of submission to their donors. (Article 25)
INGOs are also required to submit copies of “the pro-
ject documents and financial agreements with donors 
by copying original documents “ to the MoFa and to 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance, within 30 days 
of the date the agreement with donors. It should be 
noted that this is not a requirement explicitly limited 
to proposals and financial agreements for projects tak-
ing place within Cambodia.9
Implications of LANGO 
on the access to fundamental 
human rights
LANGO threatens the freedom of association, expres-
sion and assembly10 and conflicts with the Cambodian 
constitution where these rights are guaranteed:
Article 31, para. 1: The Kingdom of Cambodia shall rec-
ognize and respect human rights as stipulated in the 
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the covenants and conventions 
related to human rights, women’s and children’s rights.
Article 41: Cambodian citizens shall have the freedom 
of expression, press, publication and assembly. No one 
shall exercise this right to infringe upon the rights of 
others, to affect the good traditions of the society, to 
violate public law and order and national security. The 
regime of the media shall be determined by law.
Article 42: Citizens of Cambodia shall have the right 
to establish associations and political parties. These 
rights shall be determined by law. All citizens of Cam-
bodia may participate in mass organisations for the 
mutual benefit to protect national achievement and 
social order.
These rights are also protected by the international 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which 
Cambodia is a party. There may be legitimate concerns 
about criminal activities involving civil society groups, 
however, as expressed by OHCHR, existing criminal law 
is the proper vehicle by which to address such con-
cerns.11 The constitutional council did not rule LANGO 
 9 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Comments on 
the Fifth Draft Law on Associations and Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations of the Kingdom of Cambodia, June 11, 
2015, P. 17
10 OHCHR, A Human Rights Analysis or the Law on Asso-
ciations and Non-governmental Organisations, 4 August 
2015.
11 OHCHR, A Human Rights Analysis or the Law on Asso-
ciations and Non-governmental Organisations, 4 August 
2015, p. 3; See also Szombor, P. 2015, ‘The government, 
U. S. spar over pending NGO law’, The Cambodia Daily, 
June 3, 2015. https:// www.cambodiadaily.com/ archives/ 
prime-minister-us-spar-over-pending-ngo-law-84863
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unconstitutional. However, it is very clear several provi-
sion of LANGO are not in line with the constitution. The 
ruling party has very effectively abused its control over 
constitutional institutions to severely inhibit, exhaust 
or block all avenues of legal recourse against LANGO.
Other new, oppressive laws
In addition to LANGO a number of other oppressive 
laws have been enacted over the last two years which, 
taken together, clearly demonstrate that suppression 
of criticism and dissent, rather than support of democ-
racy and accountability, is a government priority.
On 16 July 2014, the Law on the Organization and Func-
tioning of the Supreme Council of Magistracy, the 
Law on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors and 
the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the 
Courts were adopted. All three laws further under-
mine the independence of the judiciary. The Law on 
the Supreme Council of Magistracy gives the Minister 
of Justice a greater role within the Council and greater 
influence over judges and prosecutors.
In March 2015 two new election laws were passed by 
the National Assembly: the Law on the National Elec-
tion Committee (NEC) and the Law on the Election of 
Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA). NGOs are 
barred from criticising parties during the election cam-
paign with provisions banning NGOs from “insulting” or 
showing bias to parties.12
In December 2015 a new Telecommunications law was 
passed that gives the government sweeping powers to 
spy on electronic communication. It also criminalizes 
any electronic communication – for example Facebook 
posts  – deemed to cause “national insecurity” with 
up to 15 year prison sentences. The law requires tele-
communication firms to provide the Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications with all of their service data, 
without the need for a warrant. In a comment on the 
law LICADHO said “Every phone conversation, text mes-
sage, email, or social media activity could be under 
observation – and subject to punishment – at any time 
12 See Cambodia Daily reporting on the laws https:// www.
cambodiadaily.com/ archives/ national-assembly-passes-
election-laws-80199/ https:// www.cambodiadaily.com/ 
archives/ constitutional-council-approves-judicial-laws-
sends-to-king-63282/ 
without the knowledge of those involved.”/ …/ ”the law 
is so vague that it is very difficult to determine the 
legality of an act at the point of commission.” The law 
also enables prosecutors to order the destruction of 
“prohibited or harmful” evidence prior to trial, which 
could permit the destruction of evidence proving the 
innocence of those facing charges. It allows for govern-
ment to essentially nationalise private telecoms firms 
if compelled by vague “force majeure” circumstances, 
and for the government to terminate and replace senior 
management staff if a firm is deemed to have violated 
the law. All Telecoms operators are now required to 
apply for a new license within one year, meaning the 
government will decide on the continued existence of 
the internet providers, TV and radio stations shortly 
before for the 2017 commune election.13
In April 2016 a Trade Union Law (TUL) was passed that 
seriously undermines the freedom of association, the 
right to organise and the right to collective bargaining – 
rights that Cambodia has committed to by ratifying the 
ILO conventions 87 and 98:14
The TUL stipulates minimum requirements of the num-
ber of local unions needed to form a federation (nine) 
and the minimum number of federations needed to 
form a confederation (six). These are high requirements 
for some sectors and is a means to prevent unions 
from building strength through numbers. (Article 10)
13 In an interview reported by the Cambodia Daily a spokes-
person for the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions uttered: “Mr. Makara added that his ministry was 
not involved in eavesdropping on communications and 
that the “legitimate authorities” vested with the power 
to approve such activity were at the ministries of inte-
rior and justice. Neither could offer an explanation of 
how this power would be exercised. Interior Ministry 
spokesman Khieu Sopheak said, “I’m not a lawyer, thank 
you,” and hung up on a reporter. Justice Ministry spokes-
man Chin Malin said he did not know who the “legiti-
mate authorities” were, either, but would try to find the 
“technical experts” who did. Szombor, P. ‘Rights Groups 
Warn of Tough Telecoms Law’, The Cambodia Daily, March 
14, 2016 https:// www.cambodiadaily.com/ news/ rights-
groups-warn-of-tough-telecoms-law-109837/ ; See also 
Licadho, Cambodia’s Law on Telecommunications, A 
Legal analysis, March 2016. https:// www.licadho-cam-
bodia.org/ reports/ files/214LICADHOTelecomsLawLegalA-
nalysis_March2016ENG.pdf
14 OHCHR, 2016, A Human Rights Analysis of the Draft Law 
on Trade Unions, ttp:/ / cambodia.ohchr.org/ WebDOCs/ 
DocNewsIndex/2016/032016/ TUL_Analysis-Eng.pdf; 
International Trade Union Confederation, 2015, Ten top 
concerns with the November Trade Union Law.
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TUL requires a presence of at least 51 % of the mem-
bers of a union for a strike ballot, for holding a general 
assembly or for deciding about amendments to the 
statutes. For larger unions in particular, this is a diffi-
cult requirement to meet. (Article 13)
Unions are prevented from entering any legal arrange-
ments – opening bank accounts or entering into con-
tracts etc – prior to being registered. (Article 14)
Unions are required to report on all their activities on 
an annual basis and to provide details of their bank 
accounts. As under LANGO, the government has a dis-
cretionary right to carry out inspections and request 
information at any time. Unions are required to provide 
information about changes of bank account or mem-
bership numbers within 15 days – a bizarre requirement 
considering how fluid union membership tend to be. 
(Article 17)
Union leaders are required to be literate and TUL pre-
vents anyone who have ever been convicted of crime 
from holding elected office. Considering the high pro-
portion of illiterate people among workers and Cambo-
dians in general this is a serious limitation. The law also 
requires elected officials to be a minimum of 18 years 
old, which could have serious implications in for exam-
ple garment factories where most of the employees are 
young, illiterate women. (Article 21)
Instead of following provisions for dissolution as pre-
scribed in the union’s bylaws, Article 29 prescribes that 
a union can be dissolved if 51 % of members bring the 
issue to court.
Article 65 uses vague language that could be used to 
punish unions. In a parallel with LANGO it says that 
unions are not allowed “to agitate for purely politi-
cal purposes or for their personal ambitions”. Another 
otherwise lawful strike could be deemed illegal if the 
union has a picket line outside an enterprise during a 
strike and is found “To cause a congestion or block an 
entrance and exit gate in the premises of the enter-
prise or establishment or to violently incite or threaten 
or prevent or coerce, through all means, non-striking 
workers not to work and close public streets.” Article 24 
says that “relevant parties” may request an audit of a 
union. It is unclear who is a “relevant party” and it risks 
subjecting unions to harassment and having to pay the 
expenses of numerous audits
Chapter 15 includes provisions about sanctions. 
Employer sanctions are too low to be dissuasive. For 
almost all violations, the maximum fine is a mere 
five million riel (USD 1250), which is not a significant 
amount for a factory owner. The maximum sanction 
for obstructing the formation of a trade union is just 
one million Riel. At the same time worker sanctions are 
high relative to union income – five million riel – which 
could be used to drain unions of money.
In addition to the above laws, a pending Accounting 
and Audit Law may impose mandatory external audits 
on NGOs.
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In the following some likely practical implications of 
LANGO will be presented.
Increased interaction with government bureaucracy 
will escalate demands for bribes: There is an estab-
lished practice of authorities requesting bribes when-
ever citizens depend on their cooperation. Likewise, 
NGOs are requested to pay “fees” for licenses, permis-
sions, forms, receipts or whenever any documents can 
be issued or received. LANGO’s mandatory registration 
and increased reporting requirements, which place an 
extensive administrative burden on CSOs, will inevita-
bly lead to an increase in the quantity and overall level 
of bribes requested by authorities The following exam-
ples show interactions with government bureaucracy 
illustrating how LANGO will be used to drain CSOs of 
money.
Escalating registration costs: While there is no official 
registration fee, several respondents described how 
the unofficial fee paid to MoI in order to receive the 
registration license has increased dramatically; from a 
fee of USD 300 in 2013, by 2015 the requested fee was 
frequently as high as USD 1,200. As the cost of regis-
tering community groups formed through NGO projects 
will almost certainly fall on NGOs, this will prove a sub-
stantial extra financial burden.
Refusal to pay the requested unofficial fees generally 
results in delays on the side of authorities, and there is 
little to prevent authorities from dramatically increas-
ing bribes requested from NGOs since it is common 
practice to simply comply with their requests. In 2013, 
a suggestion was circulated throughout a major NGO/ 
INGO umbrella organisation that members share infor-
mation and agree among each other accepted maxi-
mum amounts, in order to push back on the dramatic 
increase in the amounts requested, but the initiative 
never materialised.
Producing written bylaws and approaching the MoI for 
approval is the first hurdle in the registration process, 
and a particularly burdensome one for associations 
with weak administrative resources and skills. Even 
with the less rigorous pre-LANGO requirements the 
registration process normally required that provincial 
organisations make at least one trip to Phnom Penh, 
and it was very common for authorities to delay and try 
to find errors in submitted documentation in order to 
increase the pressure to pay bribes. The International 
Center for Non-profit Law (ICNL) describes the pre-
LANGO process to register with MoI as follows: “Local 
NGOs that register with Ministry of Interior (MoI) are 
also subject to complex and lengthy procedures, pur-
suant to the LANGO. The process starts with securing 
approval on key documents from local authorities and 
submitting them to the MoI. Most of the applications 
do not meet the requirements for registration without 
assistance from MoI officials. The applicant may need 
to make revisions and/ or wait for approval from one 
official or another. Reportedly, this process can be even 
more difficult if no payments are made to officials.”1
Costs for reporting and submitting documents: In a 
context in which small provincial NGOs and associa-
tions are frequently computer illiterate, the amount 
of paperwork imposed by LANGO will prove extremely 
challenging. It will be difficult to find the means to pro-
duce and regularly submit the numerous required doc-
uments. Furthermore, bribes are frequently requested 
for authorities to even issue receipts confirming that 
they have received mandatory documentation. One 
well-known national NGO that engages in soft advo-
cacy was asked to pay for a receipt confirming that they 
had notified authorities of a change of their executive 
director. They are still waiting to receive the receipt 
after two years.
1 http:// www.icnl.org/ research/ monitor/ cambodia.html 
(accessed October 2015)
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Costs for implementation of legislation that was 
previously ignored: The entire spirit of LANGO is one 
of controlling civil society through red-tape barriers. 
Therefore, as LANGO gives authorities increased control 
over and information about NGOs/ associations, there 
will be increased pressure to comply with other areas 
of legislation as well. As an example, an NGO director 
told the author about challenges in connection with 
the registration of assets belonging to the NGO. The 
organisation was instructed to either bring their cars 
for registration in Phnom Penh, which could potentially 
halt their provincial operations for months while the 
car was in Phnom Penh awaiting registration, or pay 
a hefty bribe to enable smooth registration. Instead, 
the organisation choose to register the vehicles as pri-
vate property of the director of the organisation, which 
required a smaller bribe and did not technically require 
the NGO itself to pay the bribe. This increased the risk 
of the organisation losing their assets in the case of a 
dispute with the director. According to the auditor this 
is not a unique situation; audit reports regularly point 
out situations in various NGOs whereby assets paid by 
donors have wrongly been registered as private prop-
erty of the director.
Increase of kick-back requirements: When authorities 
are in a position to determine who will benefit from 
projects it is not uncommon that there are expecta-
tions of kick-backs from prospective beneficiaries. 
One respondent reported that in one case of an INGO 
working in cooperation with authorities, channelling 
money to a local association, authorities requested 
compensation from the association amounting to half 
the amount channelled to it (USD 250 from a total 
USD 500). With an already-established culture of kick-
backs, increased coordination with line ministries, in 
addition to authorities’ increased insights into NGO 
budgets, is likely to increase the size of the budget 
share requested by authorities. Today there are fre-
quently a more or less open price tag on many posi-
tions with Ministries involved in the implementation of 
aid programs due to the possibilities to extract profits. 
Increased possibilities for the Ministries to influence 
and control the implementation of CSO programs risks 
permeating NGOs with the same culture.2
2 Recent corruption in MEDICAM offers an illustration 
to large scale corruption in a program run in coordi-
nation between Government and NGOs. See reports 
in Cambodia Daily and in BBC http:// www.bbc.com/ 
news/ uk-25141586; https:// www.cambodiadaily.com/ 
Encouragement of fraud: When donors demand zero 
tolerance of corruption, and in an international aid 
environment increasingly sensitive to CSO corruption, 
there is much at stake for NGOs willing to pay substan-
tial bribes. The unofficial registration fee, as well as 
other bribes, are paid without receipts and cannot be 
accounted for or openly funded from donor budgets. 
Trying to raise an increasing amount of bribes to com-
ply with demands from corrupt officials comes with 
the risk of encouraging fraud within NGOs if funds are 
diverted from donor budgets and hidden in manipu-
lated financial reports.
Rigged competition for grants: The extensive amount 
of information shared with authorities– including suc-
cessful proposals and donor reports – will result in cor-
rupt officials having access to detailed project designs 
from organisations competing for the same grants. This 
could possibly lead to confidential information being 
leaked/ sold from authorities to competitors.
Costs of financial audits: It is not clear whether “finan-
cial reports” and rights to audit expressed in Article 
25 of LANGO refer to financial audits by external audi-
tors. However, it is clear that external auditor reports 
required by donors will have to be submitted to author-
ities along with all other reports shared with donors 
(Article 25).
Access to external audit reports would provide the 
easiest way for authorities to control and moni-
tor the financial status of an organisation – it would 
tell authorities if the information shared in financial 
reports is correct and if tax has been paid. If author-
ities interpret their right3 to audit and check organi-
sations as a right to demand external audit reports a 
number of complications will arise. For example, audi-
tor fees are likely to increase substantially if there is 
a further increase in demand for Cambodia’s limited 
number of auditors. Furthermore, Article 25 prescribes 
that the annual financial reports are to be submitted 
to the authorities by the end of February – one month 
earlier than the reporting date for NGOs to back donors, 
which also allows one further month to produce the 
archives/ anti-corruption-unit-reports-on-health-sector-
bribe-case-49863/ 
3 “The Ministry of Economy and Finance or the National 
Audit Authority may, if necessary, check and audit an 
association and a non-governmental organization.” 
(LANGO, Article 25)
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audit reports. The decreased reporting timeframe risks 
further affecting the availability of auditors and hence 
contributing to increased audit costs.4
In January 2016 the National Assembly passed a new 
accounting and audit law, regulating accounting and 
audit procedures for among others NGOs which is 
now awaiting approval by the Senate. It remains to 
be seen how this will be applied and if it will extend 
requirements on NGOs to carry out external audits. In 
comments on the law IFAC, the International Federa-
tion of Accountants, points out that Article 3 of the 
law makes the same regulations apply for all kinds of 
organisations, disregarding their size, which they say 
is unlike what jurisdiction normally looks like in other 
countries.5 Asked about the impact IFACs Cambodian 
representative answered: “an NGOs potential require-
ment is to submit to relevant authorities the audited 
financial statements of the whole organisations”.6
Costly retroactive tax payments: Another area of inse-
curity following increased control over civil society is 
the Government’s attitude towards tax debts. Due to a 
history of lax tax collection it is very common that Cam-
bodian NGOs/ NGO staff have avoided paying income 
tax. Tax officials have in the past asked for small, unof-
ficial fees to distribute the paperwork necessary for 
NGOs to pay their tax. However, the government has 
increased tax collection efforts substantially over the 
past two years and there are signs that this will also 
lead to increased pressure on NGOs to start paying their 
taxes in line with other sectors. In early June the Gen-
4 Another challenge with increased pressure to carry out 
financial audits is the lack of professionalism found in 
many audit firms. No Cambodian audit firms are full mem-
bers of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 
the international body for maintaining and controlling 
standards of auditing (www.IFAC.org). As an illustration of 
malpractice involving auditors, one respondent reported 
about how her brother, who is working for a ministry as 
an officer in a project funded by outside donors, had 
been blackmailed by an auditor who was threatening to 
accuse and frame him for fraud that he had not commit-
ted unless he bribed the auditor. Another respondent 
had experience of auditors even trying to demand sexual 
services from a staff member of his organisation in a 
blackmailing situation.
5 file:/ / / C:/ Users/ M/ Documents/ BfwD/ drafts/ Kap%20
5 %20recommendations/2015_09_IFAC%20letter%20
audit%20law_Cambodian-National-Assembly-Letter-15-
Sept-Final-Draft.pdf Accessed March 2016; See also Kang 
Sothear, National Assembly Passes Accounting and Audit-
ing Law. The Cambodia Daily, January 16, 2016 https:// 
www.cambodiadaily.com/ news/ national-assembly-
passes-accounting-and-auditing-law-105501/ 
6 E-mail correspondence with Benilda C. Fernando.
eral Department of Taxation issued a notice (No. 3435) 
demanding that all enterprises settle tax debts prior to 
the end of June 2015 or their bank accounts would be 
frozen7. With such an aggressive pursuit of back taxes 
towards enterprises, it is extremely unlikely that NGOs 
would receive different treatment, especially in situa-
tions where authorities have full access to the finan-
cial reports of NGOs/ associations. The broad powers 
LANGO gives authorities to request financial reports 
and to conduct audits of NGOs/ associations will make 
it very easy to hit down on current and past tax evasion. 
With donor budgets shrinking at the same time as NGO 
staffing costs increase through taxation, it is likely that 
this will have an impact on salary levels in NGOs.
Several respondents expressed concern about the risk 
of retroactive tax payments being enforced on NGOs. 
Although no respondents had yet experienced requests 
for back-payments stretching back to when the organi-
sation was first registered, interviews confirm arbitrar-
iness in demands made by tax officials when NGOs try 
to start paying their taxes: sometimes authorities do 
not require any retroactive tax payment at all while 
others have demanded a years’ worth of back-pay-
ments. A rigorous implementation of back-dated debt 
settlement could threaten the existence of many, espe-
cially older, NGOs if debts have to be settled from the 
time of first registration.
The Law on Taxation provides for cases of non-pay-
ment of taxes and punishments thereof (Articles 108–
116 & 125–137). With the access to information given to 
authorities by LANGO, consequences for NGOs could 
be very harsh if the Law on Taxation is enforced with 
regards to historical tax debt:
  Article 108 makes directors liable for intentional 
withholding of taxes;
  Article 111 provides for confiscation of property;
  Article 113 provides for freezing of bank accounts
  Article 116 (3) provides for procedure where tax 
assessment is withheld and government inde-
pendently assesses tax liabilities based on infor-
mation available.
7 KPMG, Technical update, Notification on calling for enter-
prises with tax debts to settle (No 3435 GDT), https:// 
www.kpmg.com/ KH/ en/ IssuesAndInsights/ ArticlesPub-
lications/ Documents/ Technical%20update_June%20
2015_Cam.pdf, (accessed October 2015)
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LANGO is deliberately made 
 difficult to comply with
The Government has spent years developing LANGO 
and has had plenty of time to address technical weak-
nesses, but still many areas of the law have been left 
vague and incomprehensive. The reason for this is 
hardly that the government lacks access to the tech-
nical skills needed to produce a comprehensive leg-
islation and after several campaigns against LANGO 
they should be well aware about objections from civil 
society. More likely, it is a deliberate strategy from the 
side of authorities to make it difficult to comply with 
LANGO. The heavy administrative requirements and the 
many vague areas of the law make it easy for author-
ities to find grounds to fine, extract bribes and close 
down NGOs – also from those trying to comply – in a 
very arbitrary way.
As an illustration, one respondent reported how his 
NGO has repeatedly been refused to make their tax 
payments: they are told that they need a letter from 
MoI acknowledging that the organisation has changed 
office before they are allowed to pay their tax, and as 
MoI refuses to issue such a letter they are now vulner-
able to punishment. In a situation where authorities 
want to close down or pressure CSOs, tax and red-tape 
is an easy avenue, compared to more overt pressure, 
such as violence and arrests. It is difficult for outside 
stakeholders – development partners, Embassies etc. – 
to criticise a government for exercising its legitimate 
right to raise taxes.
Moreover, as the amount of activities that the LANGO 
criminalizes is so vast8, the Government cannot prac-
tically enforce LANGO more than very selectively, as 
expressed by ICNL: “Moreover, as a policy matter 
enforcement of mandatory registration requirements, 
and the corresponding prohibition of activities carried 
out by unregistered groups or organisations, may be 
difficult to implement and unworkable in practice. No 
regulatory body responsible for gathering such infor-
mation has the means to pursue every group (two or 
more) of individuals who gather together with a dif-
8 Any domestic association and non-governmental organi-
sations that is not registered shall not be allowed to carry 
out any activity within the Kingdom of Cambodia (Article 
9).
fering level of frequency and may be performing the 
broadest variety of imaginable activities, from harvest-
ing crops, to playing chess or Pétanque, to producing 
handicrafts. Furthermore, there is no need for the gov-
ernment to waste its resources in seeking to limit the 
activities of such groups.”9
In other words, the rationale behind a law that is 
“impossible” to implement and difficult to comply with, 
must simply be to spread fear. By making it difficult 
to comply, and with harsh punishments for non-com-
pliance, the Government signals that CSOs should be 
careful: “your operations depend on the good will of 
authorities”.
To summarize
  It remains unclear who will be required to register. 
The extensive registration and reporting require-
ments of LANGO will pose financially and practically 
impossible to comply with for associations/ CBOs 
but also for many NGOs.
  The number of bureaucratic barriers will make it 
very easy to prevent well-resourced NGOs from 
being able to comply fully, even if they have the 
ambition to do so. It will open up many new pos-
sibilities for civil servants to drain NGOs on money.
  The government is already able to arbitrarily clamp-
down on NGOs and use the judicial system to intim-
idate NGOs. Cambodia is not characterised by rule 
of law and there is no need for the government to 
have LANGO to assert its powers. Instead the most 
likely reason for its enactment is to install fear with 
CSOs to make them self-censor and self-regulate. 
Many terms and definitions in LANGO, the Trade 
Union Law and the Telecommunications law – such 
as “neutrality”, “if necessary”, violations of “national 
culture” etc. – are intentionally kept vague to give 
authorities broad powers to control and intimidate 
CSOs
  If LANGO is successfully rolled out, it will help CPP 
to extract resources from Civil Society Organisa-
tions (CSOs) by extorting considerable fees. It will 
align CSO projects even closer with CPPs objectives.
9 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Comments on 
the Fifth Draft Law on Associations and Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations of the Kingdom of Cambodia, June 11, 
2015, p. 7.
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  It is likely that many of the costs for registration 
and reporting of community based groups & asso-
ciations founded and supported by NGOs will be 
passed on to NGOs. With the financial and admin-
istrative resources needed to register, it is difficult 
to see that CBOs could be registered in broad num-
bers without the active “support” from NGOs.
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This chapter presents respondents’ strategies for 
meeting the shrinking space for civil society.
CBO positions on registration: Only two out of 35 inter-
viewed community activists considered registration. 
The vast majority of CBO1 respondents expressed that 
as the sole purpose of the legislation is to limit their 
space they saw it as necessary to actively avoid com-
plying. They expressed that even if they did comply, 
this would not prevent them from being targeted – not 
the least since key parts of the legislation are open 
to arbitrary interpretation. Registration would instead 
make it easier for authorities to single out and target 
representatives of the CBOs:
“Why should we register, they are only trying to con-
trol us?” (CBO member).
“We cannot register. They want us to register to 
make us stop protesting for our land. If we stop 
protesting there is only one outcome: we will starve. 
If we continue to protest there are at least two pos-
sible outcomes: we might get the land back or we 
might starve.” (CBO member)
One CBO respondent, involved in farmers’ self-help 
organising, had registered his group – a local branch of 
a bigger organisation – as an agricultural cooperative 
with the help of an NGO and under a legal framework 
other than LANGO. Their rationale for registering was to 
obtain access to funding in a government-controlled aid 
program. The majority of other members of the same 
organisation were not registered. Another respondent 
was undecided. All others rejected the idea of registering.
1 In the following CBO refers to groupings of voluntarily 
cooperating citizens as opposed to NGOs with employed 
staff members (hence CBOs here include associations 
unlike in the vocabulary of the LANGO).
NGO/ INGO positions on registration: The strong rejec-
tion of registration among CBO representatives was 
in stark contrast to the positions of Cambodia’s two 
leading NGO umbrella organisations, which have both 
expressed that compliance with LANGO is unavoida-
ble. The NGO members of the umbrella organisations 
are already registered, but their target groups include 
unregistered self-help groups of various kinds. The 
director of one of the two NGOs expressed the follow-
ing position:
“Whatever human rights and advocacy associations 
say, a law is a law and you need to comply. So, first 
civil society needs to understand what is in the law, 
the implications but also the opportunities. Sec-
ond, it is important to work with the government 
to make them understand our reservations and 
concerns about the law. We need to send them a 
message saying, well, the law has passed but here 
are our remaining concerns. So we have to work 
with the government to look at the guidelines for 
implementation. Thereby we can reduce a lot of dif-
ficulties with the implementation.”
When asked what would happen if the dialogue pro-
cess fails and everyone still have a requirement to reg-
ister, and why the government would listen to them 
now but not during the stop and consult campaign, he 
answered: “Then people on the ground will ring the bell 
[and say] we will not tolerate what you have done.” He 
also stated that his organisation would limit their own 
advocacy but intended to train communities to engage 
in advocacy. The other NGOs in the survey were aligned 
to the position of the CBOs.
An INGO director strongly rejected the idea of comply-
ing with CBO registration requirements but mentioned 
how registration could, eventually, also be used to the 
advantage of communities:
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“There is no reason for associations to rush to regis-
ter. If they do it will be easier for the authorities to 
control them, and they will stop them from being 
empowered to change their situation. Only if com-
munities are strong enough to negotiate from a 
position of power, with enough, well-organised 
members, can they use the registration as a way to 
gain recognition.”
A similar perspective was shared by three other INGO 
representatives. Contrary to limiting support to com-
munity groups, they were looking for ways to expand 
support to community activists and to groups with 
movement building aspirations.
CBO strategies for how to meet 
the increased oppression
Creating strength by numbers: A respondent from a 
member-based organisation, which currently holds 
a NGO registration, said they would use the registra-
tion pressure on communities as an opportunity to 
increase membership numbers and become a fully 
member-based organisation:
“When community activists are asked to register we 
tell them to become members of our organisation 
instead. It is safer for them and it is safer for us. It is 
more difficult to target an organisation if there are 
many members and when there is always someone 
to replace the leaders [if they are arrested]. They 
cannot arrest everyone in an organisation with 
many members and many leaders. It is much easier 
to target an NGO with a few easily recognised lead-
ers who cannot as easily be replaced. If the NGO 
leaders are arrested their organisations stop func-
tioning. But in a strong association with a lot of 
members no one is irreplaceable.”
Several respondents expressed the need to use crea-
tive approaches in trying to avoid control efforts:
  More effective risk-sharing: “We never tell them 
who is the leader. We try to lead together. Then 
they do not know whom to arrest. We also build 
solidarity with other groups who assist us and we 
assist them. Together we become too many for 
them to arrest.”
  Several communities train dual layers of leaders 
in order to become less vulnerable: “In case one 
leader is arrested there is someone to take over.”/ 
…./ ”The more people they need to arrest to stop us, 
the more unlikely it is that they will arrest us.”
  Circumvent restrictions: “We were told that we were 
not allowed to organise a public meeting outside 
the governor’s office. Then we asked for an appoint-
ment with the governors’ office instead. They only 
allowed two of us to come for the meeting, so then 
the other 500 of us accompanied the two to the 
governor’s office and were waiting outside during 
the appointment. Officially we were not having a 
public meeting but that in practice that is what we 
did.”
  Meet and communicate in less obvious ways to 
avoid suspicion – “We meet outside the village and 
pretend to be drinking beer together.”
  Social media and communication technology can 
sometimes offer alternatives to physical meetings. 
Several respondents mentioned that SMS commu-
nication is helpful for avoiding attention when plan-
ning activities, if it is difficult to meet in person 
without raising attention.
Despite the threats from the pending telecommunica-
tions/ cyber law, there was, however, not much read-
iness to deal with surveillance or online censorship. 
While there was a high awareness among the NGO 
respondents, very few CBO respondents had any kind 
of awareness of safety measures for phone or online 
communication. A high proportion of the interviewed 
community activists owned smartphones and accessed 
information relevant to their activism online but very 
few used their smartphones for documentation or 
advocacy purposes.
From the interviews it was clear that also illiterate 
activists use social media and are active online. One of 
the interviewed unions had developed a specific smart-
phone application that enables illiterate members to 
communicate with each other and their leaders.
Some respondents also mentioned how they tried to 
“humanize” relationships with authorities by develop-
ing personal relationships with individual policemen. 
They mentioned that this reduces tension and enables 
negotiation, while not allowing themselves to be intim-
idated into stopping their activities through maintain-
ing relationships:
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“They send spies to our meetings. So what we do 
is not to mobilise all of us, but heads of smaller 
groups meet in a coffee shop. Or we meet 10–20 
people under the trees where the motodops do 
not go, and with some beer. If authorities come we 
invite them for beer.” – community activist.
“Even if we only meet to play music authorities 
come to monitor us. But this started already before 
LANGO. The police spy at me all the time. …. We 
know the police commissioner and everyone and 
can have some understanding, we know them since 
long, the newer ones can be more problematic. We 
try to negotiate with them.” – community activist.
However, another representative also mentioned how 
a strategy of developing relationships can be a dou-
ble-edged sword as the police also has an interest in 
developing relationships in order to extract information:
“The problem now is that they try to pay our mem-
bers to spy on us. The police never used to be 
friendly with us [before]. Because we work for the 
community and are protesters, they used to beat 
us. However, nowadays they come and try to speak 
friendly to us and ask us to please let us know if we 
plan to do any activities and claim that ‘we are all 
working for the people’. This is a new strategy they 
have in order to make us share information with 
them.” – community activist.
“Their strategy is to appear soft to people while 
using a hard strategy and threats towards the com-
munity leaders. They take all the names and want 
to know who are the leaders of the community.” – 
community activist.
CBO approaches to fear
As mentioned, there are strong indications that peo-
ples’ attitudes towards authorities are changing. How-
ever, while the government cannot be everywhere all 
the time, fear levels are still high and are effectively 
doing the job for the government in constraining active 
citizenship. As expressed by one respondent:
  “The problem is that people respect the authori-
ties as their father and mother, they have to agree 
and cannot question the decision of the govern-
ment. However, this is changing. We try to tell the 
community that you are the owner of the country 
and you have power and have the right to request 
the government to serve you because you elected 
them.” – member-based NGO.
Several CBO respondents expressed the need to use 
defiance as a tool to counteract fear:
  “The authorities are nowadays more careful not to 
threaten us in public, they are more concerned 
about their image after the election, but the 
threats against our leaders are instead getting 
worse… After the CNRP’s success in the election, 
CPP is anxious to become popular and get votes. 
We use that and continue to ask questions about 
their broken promises in public. That will break the 
respect and fear that people still have for authori-
ties.” – community activist.
  “CPP tries to divide us by giving promises about ben-
efits to some if they are loyal and abstain from pro-
testing and do not vote CNRP. But we share stories 
about how they have taken back promises before.” – 
community activist.
Another story illustrated how open defiance had even 
resulted in stolen land being handed back:
“One man said in front of local authorities: ‘In the 
last election I stopped voting CPP because you 
treated us badly, you kicked us out from our land.’ 
Then he got his land back. We need to tell them 
that if you do not serve me I will not vote for you.” – 
Community activist.
The interviews also indicated how increased access 
to information through the internet helps to increase 
awareness: “People will not allow themselves to be 
cheated anymore about the quality of the government. 
They know that the people who steal and later give 
back part of the land are the same. A problem is that 
media is controlled. But now people get information 
through Facebook.”
Counteract attempts to divide and rule: Respondents 
also shared how attempts to divide and rule by handing 
out benefits to some of the affected community mem-
bers had seriously split communities:
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“[We have] two market areas divided along political 
affiliation. It appears people are divided because of 
political affiliation. If any coffee shop supports CPP, 
only CPP supporters will go to drink coffee there 
and vice versa. Even for funerals only CPP members 
go if it is a CPP supporter. People are divided.”
All the interviewed community activists expressed 
that they intended to continue their activities despite 
increasing risks. Several mentioned that they struggled 
with fear but with their own and their communities’ 
livelihood at stake they faced no other choice but to 
continue to protest. Several community leaders shared 
stories about the importance of building solidarity and 
how their communities had come out to show support 
and give them strength when they were struggling to 
continue:
  “We share the importance of community organising 
and building solidarity as a way to fight fear.” – rep-
resentative of a member-based NGO.
  “Actually the people are very courageous and the 
leaders are afraid. This is something new. I fear 
getting arrested. They [community members] tell 
me you should not go alone and if you get arrested 
we find a way to support you. Because of the fear I 
once told them that I will stop leading the commu-
nity. But they told me then we will lose our land. And 
once when I had a problem and called them 1AM in 
the night they all came to my house, in the middle 
of the night, to support me. Before only I was strong 
but now 42 people are strong.” – community leader.
It is also clear that in some cases an experience of 
intimidation can serve to reduce fear and spur defiance:
  “I will continue, even until the end, even if I am 
arrested. My members say the same. We have been 
in prison already so we are not afraid.” – community 
leader
  A person who had been briefly imprisoned almost 
ten years ago showed the author a newspaper clip 
from that time that he always carried with him as a 
source of inspiration. The clip quoted him defiantly 
saying that he refused to accept to be released 
from prison unless his fellow activist inmates were 
also released.
  “The development of CSOs in Cambodia was very 
superficial. The decrease in democratic space and 
increase of oppression has forced a number of 
groups, whether they are NGOs or grass roots, to be 
more creative and to go beyond the working hours 
and bureaucratic approach to their work. It means 
there is a new kind of commitment to mobilising 
and engaging in advocacy. There is a new breed of 
activists, the growth of which is accelerated by the 
increased oppression, who are engaging in social 
media activism and more activist are also engaging 
in international advocacy. The repression acceler-
ates the learning and the growth of more organ-
ising. A new breed that looks less at working days 
and salaries. This activism is different to the pre-
vious attitude of NGO workers. I hear them saying 
when working late hours, this is for our children’s’ 
future, we cannot just think about investing in their 
education and health care while leaving a disaster 
behind, with eroded nature and no jobs. “ – NGO 
leader
NGO strategies for how to meet 
the increased oppression – keep 
the crocodile’s mouth open vs. 
accept what space is offered
Asked about future scenarios, views varied greatly 
about the long-term intentions of the government. 
While a majority saw a need to stay defiant there were 
also voices advocating the need to meet the new reg-
ulative framework with compliance.
Compliance, “The government has democratic inten-
tions”: A director of an umbrella organisation for NGOs 
expressed optimism about the democratic credentials 
of the government and a need to abstain from criti-
cising the government or working outside the space 
offered by the government:
“We need to be optimistic about individuals within 
the government. We need to work with the like-
minded within the government. It would be a mis-
take to not understand what the government is 
doing and cry out loud that this and that is wrong… 
The new laws reduce democracy, but Hun Sen still 
wants democracy. If we only work constructively 
together according to the above, then there can 
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still be democratic development… Otherwise you 
risk a situation where the civil society rises up, and 
repression from government increases, and there 
is no one to replace the government… Leaders 
want a good legacy. Even Hun Sen wants the young 
generation to say good things about him. When 
he steps down he wants to see that the country is 
still progressing, without any war…I appreciate the 
attempts to raise voice in the past, but now is the 
time to express solutions as well.”
Asked about why the government introduces LANGO 
the respondent stated:
“The government does not want NGOs to work closely 
with CBOs. Why? Because CBOs are well connected 
with people on the ground who are brave and walk 
on the street and stand in front of the National 
Assembly. The NGOs do not.”
Asked about what strategies he saw appropriate after 
the “Stop and Consult” campaign (a campaign for a 
modified LANGO as opposed to the parallel “Say No to 
LANGO” campaign), the same respondent expressed: “ 
[My organisation] can consolidate feedback from all 
NGOs and talk to the Ministry of Interior. I can focus 
their attention on the challenges.”
Asked whether NGOs should engage in advocacy or 
not the respondent said “In a transitional period you 
identify who should do advocacy and eventually com-
munities can do advocacy by themselves.” He saw a 
need for a division of labour between different parts 
of civil society:
“You need to identify key actors and expert organ-
isations [among NGOs] and identify connectors 
between those who work in the invited space, in 
dialogue, and those who work to empower on the 
ground. In that way the gap will be reduced… In 
that way the government will see you are all friends 
and then you can reform.”
When asked whether additional dialogue initiatives will 
prevent human rights abuses directly linked to people 
running the regime, the respondent answered: “The 
government is helping the private sector to be more 
human rights oriented, so they are moving step by 
step.”
When asked how the organisation chooses its advocacy 
strategies, another representative of the same organi-
sation answered: “We did not receive any acknowledge-
ment from MoI after we changed Executive Director two 
years ago so we need to be careful with advocacy now-
adays.”
Defiance, “You have to push the boundaries and defend 
democratic space.”: Other NGO respondents offered a 
different perspective:
“Things are going to get worse before they get bet-
ter. They cannot arrest and intimidate everyone, but 
they will pick out a few to try to scare the rest of us. 
So some of us will be arrested. But look at the elec-
tion, everyone spoke about land grabbing. So the 
more they beat and steal, the more people know it 
could happen to them as well. Long-term they can 
never win through that strategy.” – NGO director
Several NGO directors shared how they are men-
tally and practically starting to prepare for increased 
oppression:
“We are preparing. We have to make sure that no 
one is irreplaceable. We have to make sure that we 
take care of each other’s families when someone is 
arrested. I am preparing my family and telling my 
children that I do this for them, Cambodia today 
does not offer them any future. We have done this 
before and we can do it again. Someone has to 
push the boundaries and show others that it is pos-
sible [to challenge power].” – NGO director.
When asked about how to approach the risks asso-
ciated with human rights advocacy, an NGO worker 
replied:
“We need to be more strategic in how we chose what 
risks to take, but we need to continue to take risks. 
By encouraging networking and by acting together 
we do not have to stick our necks out on our own 
and can reduce the risk of being targeted… If we do 
the job for the government and censor ourselves or 
distance ourselves from activist communities, then 
they have won and democracy has suffered. There 
has to be someone pushing back in order to defend 
democratic space. Exercising oppression comes at a 
cost for the government, in form of lost popularity 
and lost legitimacy. It is very clear that the gov-
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ernment wants foreign legitimacy. It also risks aid 
and trade deals. No matter how much the Chinese 
[government] offers, the government still wants the 
European aid2, especially since this money greases 
the ministries and keeps the civil servants happy in 
very different way than the Chinese money, which 
can only be skimmed off by the top brass.”
He continued: “If we make noise and spread 
awareness every time they arrest or beat any-
one than they will think an extra time before they 
arrest someone the next time. As soon as anyone 
is arrested we need to have prepared so we can 
quickly gather outside the prison in big numbers… 
We need to name-and-shame the thugs, policemen 
and military who are involved in beatings. If their 
communities know they will feel ashamed in front of 
their families after their photos circulate on social 
media… After military families lost their homes at 
the lake and other military keep hearing about it, 
that increased the cost of oppression – therefore 
we need to spread more information about human 
rights abuse, not step back and decrease informa-
tion and advocacy.”….”When the government wants 
to ensure loyalty during time of pressure they give 
extra handouts to the military and the police. It 
costs them to buy loyalty and they will have to 
share more of what they steal. Therefore, we need 
to spread more information and create more pres-
sure on the police and on the military from their 
communities.”
Asked about what could happen if the donor commu-
nity abstained from supporting Cambodia’s handful 
of outspoken human rights groups to the benefit of 
“non-controversial” amelioration projects, the NGO 
worker answered:
“It is a very dangerous strategy if donors comply and 
stop funding groups considered too outspoken and 
think that they might change things long-term if 
they take a step back now. Someone has to keep 
the crocodile’s mouth open, also to enable the 
non-outspoken community organisers some space. 
The community organisers need the protection of 
the outspoken human rights organisations.”
2 In 2012 aid composed 42 percent of the government’s 
budget, the World Bank quoted in Seeding the Ground. 
http:// data.worldbank.org/ country/ cambodia.
Reflecting on the same question an INGO director 
answered:
“How much do you want to compromise, how much 
self-censorship do you want to get into before it 
defies your purpose? For example, if we would leave 
all work that could be considered sensitive in the 
eyes in the Government, then the only rationale for 
staying [in Cambodia] would be for self-preserva-
tion and in my opinion we would do more harm, 
because we would only serve the interests of the 
duty bearers. But certainly risk assessment and risk 
management has much more priority now.”
Parallel to strategies expressed by NGOs and CBOs, the 
INGOs also mentioned the need for developing cooper-
ation and risk sharing.
“At the INGO level we are trying hard to develop 
a joint effort and a joint analysis about how we 
should go about fighting for space, realising that 
we are only reactive and three steps behind the 
government if we continue to work from our indi-
vidual perspectives. So in order to be more effective 
in protecting our space we need to have a more 
united approach.”
Views also differed between NGOs on how to engage 
with the government:
  “We want to have a dialogue with the government 
about the technical aspects of the implementa-
tion. There is no use telling them that we do not 
want it [the LANGO], what use it is to demonstrate 
and shout on the street, they will implement the 
law anyway. But we can have a dialogue about the 
guidelines for the implementation, and perhaps 
they will listen to our advice. We need to build trust 
so they listen to us. If we criticise them they won’t 
listen… If that does not work we can train commu-
nities to advocate themselves” – Director of an NGO 
umbrella organisation.
  “They say the government does not listen to us 
because we are too critical. But last year we had 
thousands of exchanges with authorities, letters, 
e-mails and meetings with officials at all levels. If 
we were not loud they would only meet us in tech-
nical working groups every three months and there 
they anyway ignore NGOs… The organisations that 
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abstain from speaking out in order not to risk their 
dialogue with the government in fact keep asking 
for our help to organise meetings with local govern-
ment officials.” – INGO director.
Motivation for joining CSOs & 
the willingness to defend 
 democratic space
Several respondents reflected on the motivations of 
people to “organize and to advocate for democracy, 
human rights and social change”. Different CSO actors 
perceive that they have different things at stake if 
advocating for democracy, human rights and social 
change. While community activists may only be able to 
improve their situation by protesting and challenging 
power – “if we don’t protest there is one option, we will 
starve, if we protest there are at least two options, we 
might starve or we might win our land back” – NGO/ 
INGO workers may instead perceive that they risk the 
opposite. As expressed by one NGO worker:
“NGO workers live a very comfortable life in compar-
ison to the community activists. They live in their 
own houses, drive cars and work in air con offices. 
They can afford to give their children education. 
Why would they risk all that if they think that chal-
lenging the government might make them loose 
this? The community members, however, often have 
nothing more to lose.”
If NGO/ INGO workers with this perception serve com-
munities at risk there is an obvious conflict of inter-
est. With democratic space shrinking it is increasingly 
evident whether those meant to defend this space – 
according to the first model of civil society, i. e. acting 
as guardian of democracy – are willing to take on this 
role or not.
As with NGO/ INGO workers anywhere in the world, 
there are different motivating factors at play when 
people seek employment with human rights NGOs. A 
willingness to promote human rights – especially if this 
implies risks – might be second ranking to other fac-
tors, such as pay levels. Even though the private sector 
increasingly offers alternative job opportunities, the 
Cambodian NGO sector still constitutes a key sector 
of the labour market available to Cambodian univer-
sity graduates. In the experience of the author, after 
screening close to 1,000 CVs of applicants for positions 
at a human rights organisation, it is very common that 
NGO workers move between sectors  – government, 
NGO, and private sector – in a way that indicates that a 
strong commitment to human rights is not necessarily 
the first reason for their choice of career path.
Another problem is that although there are isolated 
examples of university teachers and students attempt-
ing to carve out civic space, critical thinking is not 
encouraged within a university system that is under 
close watch by authorities. The NGO/ INGO sector has a 
bias for recruiting university graduates and people with 
formal education. However, education is much easier 
to obtain for the privileged sections of society – which 
tend to be directly or indirectly interlinked with power – 
than for the underprivileged at odds with power.3
To remedy this, one INGO respondent discussed plans 
to develop alternative education opportunities and 
education methodologies. Based on deliberative ped-
agogics4 this would encourage both NGO workers as 
well as community activists to develop their critical 
thinking skills. A training program would stretch over 
an extended period of time – possibly seven months’ 
full time training – and would reduce dependence on 
staff with formal education.
Another problem that emerged is how NGOs approach 
citizens to involve in their projects. NGOs create artifi-
cial groupings of people by using per diems and other 
handouts as the prime driving force for engagement. 
However, once the per diems and other benefits dry up 
the groups tend to fall apart and civil society remains 
weak.5 It is possible that a per diem culture “crowds 
out” genuinely voluntary engagement.
3 See also Hughes, C. & Conway, T., 2003, Understanding 
pro-poor political change. London, ODI, p. 33
4 Longo, Nicholas V. (2013) “Deliberative Pedagogy in the 
Community: Connecting Deliberative Dialogue, Commu-
nity Engagement, and Democratic Education,” Journal of 
Public Deliberation: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 16. Available at: 
http:// www.publicdeliberation.net/ jpd/ vol9/ iss2/ art16
5 Compare Lowrie, John, 2009, The Name of the Game is 
“Sustainability” but does the last player count, Published 
on fundsforngos.org; “The reports and websites of NGOs 
paint a picture of onward progress, with inspiring PR 
copy framing slideshows of Cambodian schoolchildren 
and “empowered” rice farmers. On the whole, however, 
it’s hard to pinpoint many successes that would survive 
and overnight cut in aid, anything that is truly – to use 
another buzz term worn almost meaningless from over-
use – “sustainable”. Strangio, S., 2014, Hun Sen’s Cam-
bodia, Yale University Press, U. S. p. 225
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Several INGO respondents expressed a wish to see a 
stronger rights-based approach taking root, with an 
understanding of community organising that allows 
target groups to indeed organise and empower them-
selves. While many service delivery projects today lack 
such a foundation, they could potentially be replaced by 
initiatives for addressing every-day problems through 
collective action, where citizens work together based 
on more organic, common denominators/ shared inter-
ests – as opposed to top-down initiatives and being 
arbitrarily bundled together by authorities or because 
of the prospects of per diems.
Cambodia has a short history of civil society organising 
and several scholars have mentioned that low levels of 
social capital, after decades of war and turmoil, make 
voluntary cooperation difficult to achieve6. If NGOs 
were to facilitate genuinely democratic practices for 
organising and learning, amelioration projects could 
grow into a foundation for critical thinking, increase 
social capital and become a backbone for grassroots 
driven democratic change. Transforming NGO projects 
into a seeding ground for collective action would, how-
ever, require a very radical shift from the “pacifying and 
de-politicizing” modalities at use today (see chapter 
1).7 Furthermore, while authorities are not able to have 
eyes and ears everywhere all the time, they are unlikely 
to be naïve about possibilities to use amelioration pro-
jects for empowerment purposes. One representative 
from a land community shared the following story:
“If we ask for permission to discuss farming or fish-
ing techniques, they would not allow us to meet 
because we have a tradition of protest. I also tried 
to make other community members [who are not 
know to protest] organise such trainings but they 
were still not allowed. We are told to seek permis-
sion from the governor.”
This illustrates the immense importance of allowing 
NGO target groups to obtain a power analysis to iden-
tify and analyse attempts to control them.
6 See for example Trankell, Ovesen & Öjendal, 1996, When 
every household is an island. Social organizing and 
power structures in rural Cambodia. Stockholm, SIDA.
7 Brown, Graeme, 2015, Language, Management, Culture 
and Community Development. Unpublished paper; Brown, 
Grame, 2009, Community and Community Development. 
Unpublished paper.
A common theme raised by respondents was also 
the importance of moving away from the dominating, 
one-issue focused way of NGO work and articulate a 
clear and holistic theory of change. Or, as expressed 
by a representative of a member-based NGO, there is 
a need for “a bigger story” about the need to work 
together for the common good and social change, 
beyond narrow, short-term, individual benefits:
  “This is the mindset we need to have: We need to 
tell people when they join our organisations, do not 
expect to get any personal benefits from promoting 
social justice.”
  “We tell our members to think about the positive 
things associated with the sacrifices, we spread the 
message that those who are arrested and intimi-
dated are heroes, they contribute to change and 
to improve the country. It is important to spread 
the message that people have rights. That they 
have the right to protest and to make demands. 
We inform them that no one will fight for us until 
we are ready to fight ourselves.”
  “When we were fighting for Prey Long we said this: ‘It 
is an honour to be the ones defending this nature. 
For many generations to come, we will be the one 
who saved it.’ So we are trying to go from fear to 
pride. It is not about us, it is a struggle for some-
thing bigger. That is why they cannot win, because 
they only think of themselves. We are devoted, they 
are not devoted to anything. Also, where are the 
risks: how many were killed in motor bike accidents 
and how many were killed by activism?”
  “We have to connect the dots. There has to be a big-
ger story that keeps us together. Different commu-
nities increasingly see how their issues are linked 
and they see the need to offer support to each 
other.”
43Ways forward: From fear to pride
Do not encourage self-censorship: NGO actors with an 
interest in supporting democracy, human rights and 
social change need to assess their programs not just 
in the light of the new, oppressive laws but also in con-
sideration of how to best make the current movement 
towards active citizenship gain momentum. This is a 
unique moment in Cambodia’s political history in which 
people have empowered themselves to speak out at a 
frequency and magnitude never experienced before. 
International NGO and their partners need to consider 
both how their programs can support this development 
and to what extent their programs risk counteracting 
newfound willingness to speak out. Self-censorship, 
fear and compliance exercised by NGOs risk spread-
ing to the communities they work with and would help 
the government to stop this movement towards active 
citizenship. If impossible to articulate problems and 
their underlying causes it is also impossible to have a 
dialogue about how to solve them.
Address the RBA deficit: The greatest threat to “NGOs’ 
and people’s ability and willingness to organize and 
to advocate for democracy, human rights and social 
change” is not posed by LANGO but by practices inside 
the NGO community itself. As observed by Öjendal, 
increasingly few NGOs are willing to challenge power 
and act as a force for democracy. At the same time, the 
established practices of community organising tend to 
more resemble committee organising and programmes 
are not designed in a way that spurs the growth of a 
democratic civic culture. All-too-willing cooperation 
with authorities in planning and implementing aid pro-
grams has enabled CPP to use NGOs to cement their 
power.
There is a need to step up efforts to root programmes 
in a rights based approach, and to assess the sub-
stance behind claimed adherence to “empowerment”, 
“community organising” and “RBA”. Most crucially, there 
is a need to critically assess who plans, implements 
and benefits from NGO projects. It is important to asses 
to what extent project activities encourage voluntary 
collective action beyond per diems; help develop crit-
ical thinking; and empower target groups to become 
active citizens rather than passive recipients of service 
delivery. NGO projects involving extensive interaction 
with the government require a power analysis to iden-
tify and address attempts to control CSOs, as well as 
attempts to extract resources from CSOs. A practical 
step to encourage reflection could be to draw up a 
power map of the communities in which international 
NGO’s partners work, including the extent to which vil-
lage development committees, village chiefs and their 
families as well as other representatives of authorities 
are involved in planning, implementing and benefiting 
from donor funds. Donors and their partners should 
assess to what extent target groups challenge power 
and demand accountability – and to what extent they 
merely legitimise and reinforce practices designed 
by ruling party to strengthen its control. Interaction 
with authorities should be avoided if this does can-
not happen from a position of strength that enables 
negotiation. Frequently NGOs serve as intermediaries 
between communities and authorities where NGOs 
try to negotiate on behalf of communities (Ou 15). An 
empowerment approach would instead see communi-
ties organise collectively and negotiate on their own.
Increasingly scarce human rights funding should go 
to human rights defenders: It is necessary to acknowl-
edge that not all actors want to serve as agents for 
“democracy, human rights and social change” – even 
if this is part of their rhetoric. At a time when govern-
ment pressure is increasing on human rights defenders 
and funding is decreasing, it is important that scarce 
resources support those who take on the role to defend 
“democracy, human rights and social change”. While a 
plurality of approaches for how to achieve democratic 
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change may be healthy, it is important to see if there 
is any substance and real commitment to democratic 
change among those “human rights defenders” who 
comply with government demands that infringe democ-
racy. There is a risk that well-articulated NGOs are 
agents of change in name only and “crowd out” more 
genuine human rights defenders. A “strategic retreat” 
into self-censorship and compliance might very well 
be motivated by an interest in preserving status quo 
and not risk a comfortable lifestyle, rather than genu-
ine deliberations for how to best support democratic 
change.
Support deliberative education & critical thinking: If 
there is willingness but a lack competence in using a 
genuine RBA approach this can be addressed by pro-
viding substantive training opportunities. Interna-
tional NGO should consider, together with likeminded 
groups, supporting initiatives such as one discussed 
earlier which establishes long-term trainings of NGO 
workers and community activists based on the Earth 
Rights curriculum. If deliberative education is allowed 
to be the foundation of amelioration projects, they can 
indeed become a seeding ground for critical thinking 
and voluntary collective action, i. e. the backbones of 
democratic transformation. Combining rights activism 
with organising around amelioration projects might 
also provide long-term sustainability for activism.
Close the gap between NGOs and CBOs: There is huge 
gap between the stereotype NGO bureaucrat and a 
community organiser. On one hand you have white 
shirted bureaucrat, from a small segment of econom-
ically relatively privileged citizens. The stereotype 
NGO bureaucrats occasionally leave their AC offices, in 
expensive four wheel drives, to visit “vulnerable benefi-
ciaries”, share “technical expertise” and provide hand-
outs with local authorities as key counter parts. On the 
other hand you have community organising based on 
strong geographic, socio-economic and value based 
affinity between those who facilitate the organising 
process and those organising themselves.
There is a need to develop modalities for channelling 
funds and reporting procedures that do not exclude 
key groups from receiving support or taking an active 
role in program management. The donor community 
should consider how donor demands for formal educa-
tion, administrative and language skills have narrowed 
down who staffs NGOs and their choice of target groups. 
In case there is a strong conflict of interest between 
personal motivation of NGO workers and the groups 
they are meant to serve, they will not be able to fulfil 
the official mission of the NGO. Giving a greater role to 
CSO actors who have closer organic links to the target 
groups might close this gap – either through changed 
recruitment practices or by reducing the role of NGOs 
as intermediaries when supporting communities.
One way of addressing the gap could be to transform 
NGOs into member-based and democratically struc-
tured organisations, as suggested by one of the NGO 
respondents, or to open up NGO boards to represent-
atives of the groups they claim to serve. International 
NGO could address such legitimacy deficits by partner-
ing with membership-based groups to a greater extent.
Support well-informed risk taking: If everyone 
abstains from speaking out or taking actions that could 
trigger oppression, there will be no one fulfilling the 
safeguarding role of civil society. Only acting within 
a framework approved by the government inevitably 
helps an undemocratic government to cement its 
power. It is crucial that NGOs do not assist the govern-
ment in registering CBOs/ associations and collectively 
resist attempts to drain CSO funds through corrupt 
procedures which entrench CPP’s patronage system. 
NGOs should not rush to comply with LANGO and other 
unjust laws, but rather let the government “push first”. 
While there are limits to how much oppression the gov-
ernment can exert, fear and self-censorship are much 
more efficient tools for achieving broad obedience and 
control. This is the very reason for why LANGO require-
ments are deliberately kept vague, draconian and dif-
ficult to fully comply with. If NGOs agree to help imple-
ment CBO registration and reporting requirements, 
they could end up effective tools in the government’s 
exerting of control over CBOs.
It is also important that those who make the choice 
to challenge power, knowing the risks involved, are 
morally and financially supported and thatefforts 
are made to share the risk through collective action. 
There is a need to prepare practical support of those 
arrested and intimidated, for example establishing a 
fund to support the education costs of the children 
of arrested human rights defenders. Plans should be 
in place for taking over the responsibilities of those 
arrested so that targeted organisations can continue 
to function, as well as for activating networks that can 
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mobilise support and advocate on behalf of targeted 
human rights defenders. INGOs actively involved in 
international advocacy have an important role to play 
in attracting attention to the fate of Cambodian human 
rights defenders.
Cultivate a new ethos, articulate a clear theory of 
change and think towards movement building: Inter-
national NGO and their partners should reflect on the 
role of awareness-raising, organising and collective 
action in their strategies and articulate a clear theory 
of change. There is a need to assess to what extent 
individual NGOs are seeking to be part of a collec-
tive effort and how their strategies and work relates 
to the bigger picture of democratising society. NGOs 
should learn from membership-based groups how to 
build unity and strength based on a shared vision 
and a shared theory of change. There is a need to 
create a narrative about the importance to work for 
the common good and connect the dots between 
individual struggles. As expressed by one of the 
respondents: “We tell our members to think about 
the positive things associated with the sacrifices, we 
spread the message that those who are arrested and 
intimidated are heroes, they contribute to change 
and to improve the country. It is important to spread 
the message that people have rights. That they have 
the right to protest and to make demands. We tell 
them that no one will fight for us until we are ready 
to fight ourselves.”
Bringing people together around a shared vision for 
how to change society and a feeling of belonging to 
a movement, on equal terms, is something very dif-
ferent from participating in projects organised around 
top-down trainings and passively receiving handouts. If 
there is a powerful narrative, people are more inclined 
to join CSO initiatives. NGOs could play a much more 
active role in amplifying such narratives, but instead, 
as noted by Öjendal, the number of NGOs engaging in 
government critical advocacy has reduced.
Build strength through numbers, reducing individual 
risks by acting collectively: While membership-based 
groups such as trade unions have largely been out-
side the focus of NGOs, a common practice has been 
to create artificial groupings of people with the help 
of per diems and other benefits. INGOs/ NGOs need 
to consider how they can support the growth of more 
organic groupings that share strong enough common 
denominators to be willing to act together even if they 
lose NGO support.
By increasing the number of people prepared to speak 
out against power abuse, the negotiating power of 
CSOs increases and the costs of exerting oppression 
increases. As expressed repeatedly by CSO respond-
ents: if we are many enough, not everyone can be 
arrested. The more people there are to replace those 
arrested, the more difficult it is for a government to 
succeed with its oppression. Networking between dif-
ferent groupings, practical acts of solidarity with other 
groups facing oppression and the establishment of 
alliances is essential for building strength.
Prepare for how to circumvent internet censorship & 
communication surveillance: The importance of inter-
net in raising awareness and enabling people to express 
their views cannot be overestimated when explaining 
the current transformation of Cambodia. At the same 
time, the government’s intentions – seen starkly in the 
new Telecommunications Law – are clear, and exten-
sive censorship and surveillance measures are to be 
expected soon. It should therefore be a top priority to 
prepare practical measures to improve communication 
security – for example, by increasing security aware-
ness and using simple tools for encryption – and to cir-
cumvent internet censorship. Khmer language instruc-
tions for how to use proxies need to be prepared.1 It 
is essential that Cambodia’s few remaining independ-
ent Khmer language media institutions be supported 
to continue distributing news over internet, satellite 
and foreign-based radio broadcasters. Civil society 
actors need to keep developing their ICT (information 
and communication technology) skills to stay ahead of 
attempts to control communication.
Circumvent control efforts by changing funding and 
reporting modalities: With 60 countries developing 
NGO-hostile legislation over the last ten years and 
space shrinking for civil society across continents, donor 
agencies have to adapt to the changing environment by 
creatively circumventing attempts to restrict democracy 
and human rights programs. LANGO requirements on 
INGOs/ NGOs to share all project documentation with 
1 These are some easy-to-use tools: “Snowden explains 
why it is super easy to protect our privacy online” 
http:// bigthink.com/ ideafeed/ snowden-explains-why-
its-super-easy-to-protect-our-privacy-online see also 
https:// guardianproject.info/ 
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authorities can be handled in a variety of ways: by 
drowning authorities in reports; through vague report-
ing; or by actively avoiding reporting on sensitive areas 
and by channelling funds through unsurveyed channels. 
When the level of authoritarianism is on the increase, 
international NGO need to consider using covert meth-
ods, such as those that enabled support to dissidents 
in South Africa or Burma in the recent past. In order to 
reduce the pressure on partners to share audit reports 
with authorities, international NGO could also consider 
hiring their own auditor to carry out audits of unregis-
tered groups or of funds kept outside the books – sim-
ilar to how certain American funding agencies operate 
in other repressive environments – thus replacing the 
need for audits initiated by partners themselves. Costs 
could be shared with other Cambodia-based INGOs who 
would therefore be relieved of pressure to share for-
mal/ traceable audit reports with authorities.
Current funding requirements among other German 
government donor agencies include that recipients 
must be registered organisations. This is a bizarre 
requirement in light of LANGO and contradictory to 
stated ambitions to support democracy and human 
rights defenders. If constrained by back-donor require-
ments, there should be concerted lobbying efforts by 
Cambodian CSOs and INGOs to influence back-donors to 
change reporting, registration and admin requirements 
to allow for cooperation with illiterate, underprivi-
leged and outlawed groups of human rights defenders. 
It could also be helpful to pro-actively create a new 
reporting “best-practice” through cooperation between 
likeminded INGOs through collectively developing new 
procedures. Village chiefs are often involved in project 
management for the simple reason that they are literate 
and can do the required paperwork. Modern technology, 
however, provides ample opportunities allowing illiter-
ate people to deal with financial reporting. For exam-
ple, there is available software in which aggregated 
video recordings can be used to verify receipt of funds, 
instead of easily forged paper receipts.2 Encrypting the 
2 In the videos recipients state who they are, how much 
they have received, from whom and for what purpose. 
In addition, the video contains digital information about 
time and GPS position. Paper reports, fingerprinted or 
signed by (alleged) recipients, could be replaced by fin-
ger print scanning, possibly using smartphones, cheap 
fingerprint scanners or even iris scanners. Based on a 
sample of 2000 respondents, it was estimated that 94 % 
of Cambodians between 15 and 65 are estimated to own 
mobile phones, 99 % reachable by some kind of phone, 
and 30 % smart phones. Kimchhoy Phong & Javier Solá, 
same information and transmitting to encrypted data-
bases improves safety and would allow illiterate peo-
ple to handle substantial parts of a project’s financial 
management at the same time as improving accounta-
bility. In a conversation, audit firm PwC suggested that 
if about five INGOs approved of and used this method, 
PwC would consider it an acceptable best practice to 
replace parts of the paper-based reporting.
Fight corruption & patronage, strengthen democratic 
accountability: Increased accountability is strongly 
dependent on strengthening the internal democratic 
structures in CSOs, including concerted efforts to 
address gender equality. Encouraging democratic 
accountability through deliberative and democratic 
education, transparent and democratic decision-mak-
ing and abandoning “one-man/ male show” centred, 
hierarchical leadership ideals will effectively attack the 
seeding ground for corruption and patronage.
Corruption erodes CSOs and feeds the system by fuel-
ling patronage. It also creates potential blackmailing 
situations in which pending corruption cases can be 
used to threaten CSO leaders. Donor coordination, 
training in financial literacy skills, measures to improve 
financial transparency and other efforts to increase 
internal accountability and change the ethos in CSOs 
is crucial. Again, new technology makes it possible to 
simultaneously increase accountability, avoid surveil-
lance attempts and be less exclusive in the choice of 
target groups and intermediaries.
LANGO increases pressure on CSOs to bribe authori-
ties. This corruption in turn strengthens CPP’s grip of 
power. INGOs need to face the obvious inconsistency 
between zero tolerance to corruption and knowing that 
their partners fuel government corruption by spending 
outside the books. One way of pushing back is to be 
more transparent and talk about these practices.
A study of the estimated total costs for civil society 
for increased administration, registration costs and 
other bribes induced by LANGO could be used to raise 
awareness about the financial burden on NGOs result-
ing from LANGO. This could be a way to find a common 
ground to engage more groups in resisting LANGO.
2014, Mobile phones in Cambodia, Open Institute and 
Asia Foundation.
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